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INTR OD UCTION
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck
Haiti, killing approximately 222,570 people and injuring
300,572.' Nearly 1.5 million people were displaced from their
homes. 2 As of July 2011, there are still over 594,811 people
homeless from the earthquake filling any open space-from
parks to golf courses-with makeshift houses of tarpaulin and
1. See Haiti: One Year Later. U.N. OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF HUIMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, http:/iww .unocha.orgissiues-in-depthihaiti-one-year-ater (last updated jan.
18, 2011) (providing United Nations ("UN") statistics on the 2010 earthquake); Meena
jagannath et al., A RiglitsBased Approach to Lawyering: Legal Empowerment (Is an
Alternative to Legal Aid in Post-Disaster Haiti, 10 Nw. U.. INT'L Hum. RTs. 7, 7 (2011)
(summarizing the impact of the earthquake).
2. See.jagannath et al., srpra note 1, at 7 (describing the impact of the earthquake
on housing); INT'L. CRISIS GRP., PosT-(UAKL HAITI: SECURITY DEPENDS ON
RLSETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMLNT 5 (2011) [hereinafter ICG] (listing figures to
describe the earthquake aftermath).
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scrap wood. , Making life even more difficult, over forty percent
are withoutjobs.4
This persistent devastation leads many humanitarians to
contemplate how such a well-funded humanitarian effort could
be so slow to create a stable environment for victims to rebuild
their lives.5 One of the main factors contributing to the slow
progress in Haiti is that it is difficult for individuals, businesses,
and the government to verify what land is available for
reconstruction in and around the capital city, Port-au-Prince.)
Aid organizations are hesitant to provide services on land
without clear documentation of ownership. 7 New houses remain
3. See (AMP COORDINATION & (AMP MGMT. CLUSTER, EVICTION SITUATION IN
(AM PS HOSTING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 7 (2011) [hereinafter EVICTION
SITUATION] (providing oflicial figures of displaced people in Haiti); PAUL FARMER,
HAITI: AFTER THE EARTHOUAKE 140-42 (Abbey Gardner & Cassia Van Der Hoof
Holstein cds., 2011) (describing the public health implications of camps sprouting in
an unorganized fashion on public space).
4. Central America and Caribbean: Haiti, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Apr. 11, 2012),
https: /wNNw.cia.gov/library/publications/thc-world-factbook/geos/ha.tmnl (noting
that the unemployment rate is 40.6%). However, this unemployment rate is likely a low
estimate since over two-thirds of Haitians were not forinally employed before the
earthquake. and conditions have deteriorated since. See ACTION AID, BLLDING FOR THE
FITURES: HOMES ANT) SECURITY IN HAITI 2 (2011) (dicussing high unemployment rates
even prior to the disaster).
5. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HAITI. -LA s AID (HANGED:
CHANNELING ASSISTANCE To HAITI BEFORE AND AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 4--20 (2011)
[hereinafter OSE] (comparing aid delivery betore and after the carthquake); OXFAM
INT'L., FROM RELIEF To RECOVERY: SLPPORTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN POST-
EARTHQUAKE HAITI 14-19 (2011) (providing an analysis of the shortfalls of the
earthquake response) [hereinaiter OXFAM]; MARK SCHUI ER, UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS:
IMPACT OF NGOs ON HUNAv\ RIGHTS FOR PORT-A1-PRINCE'S INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PEOPIE 32-33 (2010) (discussing the shortfalls of the nongovernmental organization
("N(XO") response to the earthquake).
6. See, e.g., DEP'T OF STATE MODERNIZATION AND GOVERNANCE, ORG. OF AM.
STATES, MODERNIZATION OF CADASTRE AND ILAND RIGHTS INFRASTRUCTURE IN HAITI: A
RAPID AND INCLUSIV APPROACH 4 (2010) [hereinafter OAS] (describing the lailure of
the Haitian title registration systen); HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2012 INDEX OF
ECONOMIC FREEDOM: HAITI 216 (2012), (vailable at http:/iww .heritage.orgiindexi
pdt 2012/countrics/haiti.pdf (ranking Haiti anong the worst in the world for its
protection of property rights, awarding it ten out of one hundred points in the categor)
of protecting property rights).
7. See Human Rights Situation in the Camps for lwten ally Displaced Persons in Haiti:
Hearing at the lnteo-Aterican Commission on Human Rights. 140th Sess. (2010) (Kathleen
Bergin, Disaster ILaw Center) [hereinafLter Hum, Rights Sitta tion Hearing]
(docunenting that human rights organizations rtceived inquiries ti om Habitat
HumaniL) and others about how to ensure their right to land before building); ASHLEY
JONATHAN CI EMENTS ET AL., WORLD VISION INT'L., FU TURES IN THE BALANCE: A WAY
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unbuilt for fear that the organizations would be providing
shelter without a guarantee of land ownership.8 Investors are
similarly wary of participating in Haiti's "better" rebuilding
without assurances that they will have undisputed title to the
land on which they build Perhaps more urgently, individuals
trying to restore normalcy to their lives are being forced out of
their homes, often at night with little protection from-and
sometimes by order of-the govermnent. 10
These events are all symptoms of a problem with tenure
security. Tenure is the manner by which someone lays claim to a
parcel of land. II If no one challenges that claim or title, then the
tenure is deemed secure.1 2 If there is no clear way to verify
ownership, tenure is deemed insecure.'' International law holds
FORW ARD FOR HAITI'S CHILDREN 11 (2010) (reporting that lack of adequate land
tenure impacts not only housing but also delivery of basic services).
8. See H-lurr RighR Situation Hearing supra note 7 (documenting that human
rights organizations received inquiries forom Habitat Humanity and others about how to
ensure their right to land before building); see also (LLMLNTS LT AL., supra note 7
(noting that long-term transitional shelters cannot be provided with adequate land).
9. See RICHARD G LU GAR, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 1 I ITH CONG., WITHOU'T
RLIM i, No RLTURN ON INVESTIENT IN HAITI at v (Comm. Print 2010) (describing the
resistance of the business community to engage in a country with unclear tenure), see
also Dieudonn6 Joachim, Le Cadre Legal Haitien Inapproprie an Dcveloppernent de
L'Tmmobiier. LE NoUVLLLISTL (Haiti), june 29, 2011, http://www.lenouvCllist.com/
article4.phpnewsid-9438l (reporting on how the lack of legal certainity regarding
property rights limits Haiti's economic development). "Build back better" is a tagline
for reconstruction coined by former US President William Clinton during the
reconstruction. See Moun Andeyo, Persistent Legacies of ExLusion, in TECTONIC SHIFTS:
HAITI SINCE THE EARTHQU AKE 95, 95 (Mark Schuller & Pablo Morales eds., 2012)
(noting the limited power of President Clinton's slogan); FARMER, sup a note 3, at 153
(Abbey Gardner & Cassia Van )er Hoof Holstein eds., 2011) (discussing the "build
back better" attitude at early donor conferences).
10. See Jagannath et al., supra note 1, at 13 (describing the process of forced
evictions); Andeyo, supra note 9, at 131-32 (summarizing extensive reports of lorced
evictions after the earthquake).
11. BALLLINTINE'S LA W DICTIONARY 1266 (3d ed. 1969) (defining the term,
"tenure").
12. See INGRID W\ESTENDORP, WOMEN AND HOUSING: GENDER MAKES A DIFFERENCE
174 (2007) (defining the term. "tenurC security"); Chris Huggins, Linking Broad
Constellations of Ideas: Transitional Justice, Land fTenure Reform, and Deuelopment, in
TRANSITIONA.L JUSTICL AND DEVLLOPMLNT: MAFANG (ONNLCTIONS 332, 337 (Pablo de
Greiff & Roger Duthie, eds. 2009) (noting that tenure securit lies in the ability to
prevent one person's claims from infiinhg on another person's claims to an unfair
degree).
13. See Huggins, supra note 12, 338-39 (discussing fundamental tenure security
rights and acknowledging that diflerent persons may be able to assert diflerent rights);
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national governments responsible for protecting property rights
and shielding individual owners from competing claims of
ownership.1 4 NVhile the state has the ultimate responsibility to
protect land tenure, the government, community, and
international actors all may have a role in determining the
process by which a parcel of land is associated with an owner.'5
Natural disasters that destroy property and land markers,
like the earthquake in Haiti, can disrupt the tenure system and
make some tenure claims less secure. 16Using the example of
post-earthquake Haiti, this Note explores how a government's
ability to protect the property rights of poor landowners is
impacted by international organizations, local communities, and
government administrators involved in determining land
tenure. In asking this question, this Note hopes to show how all
actors have made tenure less secure and provides suggestions for
how they can instead work to increase tenure security.
Part I explains the concept of tenure security and its
construction as an international human right. It examines
Haiti's international obligations and national laws pertaining to
tenure security, and describes the state of tenure security in
Haiti. Part II explores how the Haitian gover nent, informal
communities, and international actors in Haiti determine land
tenure and the impact that this determination has on the
protection of the Haitian right to tenure security. Finally, Part
III suggests that for people in Haiti to enjoy tenure security, the
Haitian government must recognize the legitimacy of the
WESTLNDORP, sup note 12, at 174 (describing the requirements for telurc scturity
and noting that strength ol security depends on claim to land).
14. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (i1) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(111), art. 17(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everone has the
right to own property alone, as well as in association with others."); WFESTENDORP, supra
note 12, at 173-74 (noting that states have both a negative and positive obligation to
protCt propcrt ownership).
15. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 347-58 (discussing the multiple means of
asserting and protetting rights to ownership in u ansitioning countries).
16 . See UNI-IABITAT, LAND AND NATLRAL DISASTERS: GUIDANCL FOR
PRACTITIONERS 76-77 (2010) (listing the implications of tenure insecurity in post-
disaster situations); see also Brian Concannon Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Bette,
Longe Lasting A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT'L L.
RPV. 1145, 1146 (2011) (noting that a natural disaster can inhibit an already weak
state's ability to fulfill its obligations to its citizens and indicating that Haiti became
increasingly weak as a result of governmntc's inadequacies during [ie earthq u ake
response).
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informal land claims, and the international community must
reinforce the legitimacy of the Haitian government to confer
and protect tenure.
I. THE RIGHT TO TENURL SECURITY
Because the slow humanitarian response and lagging
economic development are rooted in the problem of tenure
security, this Part provides a full description of tenure security in
Haiti. Part L.A describes the underlying problem of tenure
security and shows how international human rights law creates a
state's obligation to protect tenure security. Next, it explains
different techniques states use to protect this right after natural
disasters. Part LB explores Haiti's international obligations to
protect tenure security and how domestic laws reflect this
responsibility. Finally, it discusses the state of tenure security
before and after the earthquake and provides an overview of the
relief effort orchestrated by international organizations.
A. Protecting the Right to Tenure Security
1. The Problem of Tenure Security
In its most basic form, land ownership is a concept
symbolized through a construction, such as a piece of paper or
communal agreement.1 This symbol represents a "bundle" of
rights that may include the right to access the land, to exclude
others from the land, to derive value from the land, or to sell the
land.' It is also possible to make a claim to more limited or
secondary rights, such as access for a specific period of time, like
17. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 341 (asserting that owncrship is an idea that
onhy has meaning if it is legitimized); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAI:
WHY CAP1TA1SM TRIUM1PHS IN THE WEST AND FAIIS EVERYWHERE ELSE 162-63 (2000)
(cmphasizing that cvcn social contracts havc cxplicit reprsclntations in real world
behaviors).
18. See OLI BROWN LT AL., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., NATURAL DISASTERS
AND RESOURCE RIGHTS: BUILDING RESILIENCE, RLBUILDIN, LIVLS 5 (2006) (describing
forms of land rights); SCOTT ILECKIE & CHRIS HUGGINS, CONFLICT AND HOUSING, IAND,
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK ON ISSULS, FRAL EWORLS, AND SOLUTIONs 2-3
(2011) (noting that most state properly protections are derived Ifoi western and
European contexts and "do not reflect the complexities of customary tenure systems").
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renting, or for a unique purpose, like farming.D- These property
rights, however, are subject to uncertainty if the claim of
ownership is not universally recognized. 20 Tenure security
considers the strength of a claim and its protection from
counterclaims. The concept of tenure security applies to all
types of claims, including secondary claims, such as renting.2'
Tenure security has numerous benefits. First, it allows
landholders to designate who has current and future rights to
the property.22 Moreover, individuals that have confidence in
their right to a parcel of land are more likely to physically invest
in that land23 Second, economists note that tenure security
benefits development because it enables individuals to leverage
19. See Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected F ilures and Inexpected
Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 1115, 1119 (1999) (noting how
dilferent rights can be given to the same parcel of land, such as when women in Kenya
had communal title to food crops on a piece of land, while the men had the rights to
the tree crops); JAA-P ZLLNBLRGLN. A PRO-POOR LAND RECORDATION SYSTEM;
ToWA RDS A DESIGN 16 (2011) (explaining that there are olten tenure security rights
referred to as secondary rights that are of particular importance to women and the
most vulnerable).
20. See Joseph Blocher, Bilding o Custom: La rd Tenure Policy aid Economic
Development in Ghana, 9 XAI F H,-,,I. RTS. & DEV. L.I. 166, 175 (2006) (arguing that
without social legitimacy, proper y rights would be meaningless); Daniel Fitzpatrick,
Evoluion and Chaos in Prperly Rightsys tens: The Third 1orld Tragedy of Contesed Access,
113 YAE IJ. 996, 996 (2006) (showing that recognizing norms is central to tenure
security). A claim on property, called a title, can be undermined by someone that has a
more powerful claim to that property. A counterclaim can be overturned if the later
claim is not viewed as legitimate. See also Blocher, sup a note 20, at 175 (explaining that
claims will not be valid if they are not viewed as legitimate by others in the community);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 20, at 996 (emphasizing the role of the community in creating
legitimacy of ownership).
21. SeeNWLSTLNDORP, supa note 12, at 174 (noting that tenure claims can include
communal or individual rights; (f LIIIANNE FAN, OXFAM GREAT BRITAIN, SCOPING
STUDY ON HOUSING, LAND AN) PROPERTY RIGHTS IN POST-LARTHQUAIKE HAITI:
SECURING TENURE, PREVENTING EVICTIONS, FACILITATING RETURN, AND
STRENGTHENING AccEss TO JUSTICE FOR THE VUINERABLE 10, 28, 39 (2010) (on file
with author) (calling attention to the need tor secondary rights to be protected in an
urban setting).
22. See KLAUS I)EININGER ET AL., INNOVATIONS IN LAND RIGHTS RECOGNITION,
ADMINISTRATION, AND GOVERNANCE, at xiv (2010) (discussing the benefits of secure
tenure promoting land renting).
23. See Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1116 (explaining that economists
view titling as the opportunity to avoid wasting resources with competing claimants):
DEIINGLR Li AL., supra note 22, at xiv (describing how individuals with insecure land
tenure are unlikely to inest in long-term improvements in their land).
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their capital to access credit24 Hernando de Soto, a leading
proponent of tenure security, goes so far as to argue that tenure
security is the key to promoting development and eliminating
poverty.2
The formal and informal legal systems that protect tenure
security face special challenges after a disaster, such as
destruction of property markers, massive displacement, and
destruction of records26 Tenure security is particularly relevant
in the aftermath of natural disasters because there tend to be
large numbers of displaced people coupled with an urgent need
to invest in new construction.27 Unless they have assurance of
exclusive title to a piece of the land, people are often reluctant
to invest in rebuilding21 Similarly, tenure insecurity impacts
many people's access to livelihood because they are hesitant to
plant crops or repair shops 9 People with malicious intent can
24. See DE SOTO, sup a note 17, at 5-6 (explaining that if an individual can
reprcsent their ownership of land in a paper symbol that is widely recognized, that
sy m1bol can be brought to a lormal banking institution and used as collateral); Huggins,
supra note 12, at 341 (summarizing dc Soto's argument for formal tenure systems).
25. See DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that tenure security is also likely to
increase ioreign investment); see a so BENJAMIN BARROS, HERNANDO DE, SOTO AND
PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 1 (2010) (noting )e Soto is a Latin American
economist famous for his detailed studics on the barriers to participating in the formal
land system); Huggins, supra note 12, at 340-41 (describing )e Soto's contribution to
properlty law).
26. See BROOKINGS-BLRN PROJLCT ON INT'L DISPLACEMLNT, HUNLAN RiGHTS AND
NATURAL DISASTERS: OPERATIONAL (UDEL INES AND FIFI) MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PROTECTION IN SITUATIONS OF NATURAI DISASTER 45 (2008) (noting that destruction
of land markers and property documentation can lead to conflict after disasters);
BROWN ET AL., supra note 18, at 16 (discussing the impact of destroyed property
markers and documcntation on reconstruction in Thailand).
27. See UN- -ABITAT, supra note 16, at 76-77 (highlighting the challenges of
tenure insecurity in post-disaster situations); see also BROWN ET A,., supra note 18, at 7
(describing how clarity and security of tenure are linked to resilience after natural
disasters).
28- See BROWN ET AL., spr#a note 18, at 16 (pointing to the importance of tenure
securit) in reconstruction efforts); Special Rapportcur, Report on Adequate Housing as a
Compone7t of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
Distrnator in this Context, Hum. Rts. Council, 11 26-28, U.N. )oc. AiHRCi16i42
(Dec. 20. 2010) (by Raquel Rolnik) [hereinafter Rolnik] (using the example of Timor
Lestc to show the potcntial tor prolonged displacement if tenure issues are not
addressed adequately).
29. See UN-IABITAT, supra note 16, at 77 (discussing thre impact of tcnurc
securiy on livelihoods after disasters); Rolnik, supra note 28, 1[1[ 8-9 (noting lat the
poor tend to be more adversely impacted by disasters).
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take advantage of post-disaster confusion and assert ownership
while the pre-disaster owner is displaced.","
2. State Responsibility to Protect Tenure Security
The concept of tenure security is formally protected as a
funtamental human right by international human rights law.
Starting with the Universal Declaration for Human Rights
("UDHR") in 1948, the international community provided the
right to "own" property and the right to protection from being
"arbitrarily deprived" of that property."' Though there is no
explicit right to property in the subsequent international
covenants, both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") provides
some property rights.32 ICESCR guarantees a right to housing
and ensures that states will "take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right." 3 Meanwhile, the ICCPR requires states
30. See BROWN ET AL., sopra note 18, at 15 (recounting lears of disaster victims that
their land would be taken while they were displaced); UN-11ABITAT, supra note 16, at
18 (describing the reasons displaced people fIcar loss of land and the impact the loss
can have).
31. See UDHR, supra note 14. art. 17(1) ("Evel)one has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others."); id. art. 17(2) ("No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property."); id. art. 25(l) ("Ever-one has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his tamily, including...
housing .. and the right to securit in the event of unemployment, sickness, disabilit,,
widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.");
see also CHRISTOPHE (OLW & IOANA CISMAS, INT'l CTR. FOR HUMIAN RTS. &
DEMOCRATIC DEV.. LEGAL OPINION: THL RIHT TO PROPLRTY FROM A HUNLAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTiIVE 24 (2010) (explaining that the history of international protection of the
right to property begins with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")).
32. See Elisabeth Wickeri, "Land is Life, Land is Power'" Landlessness, Exclusion, and
Deprivaton in Nepal, 34 FORDHAM INTI ILJ. 930, 1006-08 (2011) (providing a history of
the debate of how property rights were be included in the UDHR and subsequent
conventions); GOLAY & CISMAS, supra note 31, at 3-5 (describing the history of properLy
rigths in international law). The loss of an explicit delintion of property rights in the
covenants is of particular iniportance because the Universal Declaration of Hurnan
Rights ("UDHR") has less weight in international law than the individual covenants. See
Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 38(1 ),June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993 (declaring that the Court should weigh authorities by giving preference to: 1.
international conventions; 2. international customs: 3. general principles and laws
recognized by civilized nations; 4. judicial decisions and teachings).
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, Dec.
16, 1966. 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (" [T] he right ... to an adequate standard of living for himself
and his farnily, including adequate, lood, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
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to protect individuals against arbitrary interference of their
homes., 4 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("CESCR"), which enforces and informs the ICESCR,
expands these rights by specifically addressing the importance of
land tenure in General Comment 4.35 CESCR stipulates that the
state is responsible for "confer[ing] legal security of tenure" and
protecting individuals against forced eviction., 6 Further, General
Comment 7 explains that states have an obligation to use "all
appropriate means" to protect the security of tenure and to stop
forced evictions.
Building on these international treaties, some international
conferences adopted special principles for internally displaced
people ("IDPs"). , " For example, the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement affirm that "no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions" and that
displaced people should be protected by the state against
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to
ensure the realization of this right .... ").
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 ("1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, or correspondence.... 2. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interierence or attacks."); see also (GOI w & (ISM\AS, sopra note
31, at 3-4 (noting that many scholars interpret this to include a right for land to be
protected from arbitrary interference).
35. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Cmt. 4: The Right to
Adequate Housing, 6th Sess., 1[ 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, (Dec. 13, 1991); see also
WESTLNDORP, supra note 12, at 174 (noting that this is the first of seven aspects
necessary for adequate housing to be protected). This commentary is persuasive
authority, but not legally binding like the conventions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW O1 FORLIN RELATioNS LAW 01' THE UNITED STATES § 321 325 (b) (1986).
36. See Gen. Cmt. 4, sopra note 35, 8(a) ("Notwithstanding the type of tenure, all
persons should possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection
against forced eviction, harassment and other threats. States parties should
consequently take immediate measures aimed at conferring legal security of tenure
upon those persons and households currently lacking such protection. in genuine
consultation with affected persons and groups ..... ").
37. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Cmt. 7." The Right to Adequate
Hoasing: Forced Evictions, 16th Sess., 1[ 9, U.N. Doc. E/ 1998/22 (May 20, 1997); see also
Susan Breau, The International Law Rights to Home and Homeland, in THE IDEA O1 IHOME
IN LAW: DISPLACEMENT AND DISPOSSESSION 165, 169-70 (ILorna Fox O'Mahony & Janes
A. Sweeney eds., 2011) (emphasizing that (oiilment 7 urges states to protect its citizens
flom third parties that are conducting forced evictions).
38. See Rolnik, sopra note 28, 11 (observing that the development of these
principles marks a shift firom a purely humanitarian response to one based on
protecting individual rights); see also Wickeri, supra noe 32, aL 1011-12 (describing the
provisions for property rights in non-binding documents).
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"illegal appropriation, occupation or use" of their property.Y-
Government authorities also have the duty to assist displaced
people in regaining their property or provide them with
adequate compensation for their loss. 40 Similarly, the "Pinheirio
Principles" on Housing and Property Restitution for Refuges
and Displaced Persons, an additional international agreement
concerning displaced people endorsed by the United Nations,
discusses a right to have property ownership restored if it was
wrongfully removed. 41 It further affirms that states "shall ensure"
that men and women have equal rights to "legal security of
tenure" and that restoration programs do not disadvantage
females. 42
In the Americas, the American Convention on Human
Rights ("ACHR") also protects tenure security. 4-, This
39. Rep. of the Secretary General, V rited Nations Guiding Principles on Irternal
Displacement, Princ. 21(1). (3) U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (by
Francis M. Deng) [hereinafter Guiding Princ.]; see also Breau, supra note 37, at 181-82
(noting that these principles were drafted in 1998 by Representative of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons Francis M. Deng and then noted in a
resolution by the Commission on Human Rights). These principles have less legal
authority than the covenants but are considered persuasive authority. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993
(declaring that conventions are to be held in higher regard than principles); see also
Breau, supra note 37, at 181-82 (explaining that the principles are not a UN
declaration and do not constitute a binding instrument).
40. See Guiding Princ., supra note 39, princ. 29(2).
41. UN SUB-COMMN'N ON PROTECTION AN) PROMOTION OF HU-Mi. RTS., Principles
on Housing and Property Restitution foir Refugees and Displaced Persons, Res
2005/21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4iSub.2/2005/17, § I 2.1 (Aug 11, 2005) [hereinalter
Pinheiro Princ.]; see also Wickeri, supra note 32, at 1013 (noting that the principles
protect primary and secondary tenure claims). These principles were drafted by
international humanitarian actors and then endorsed by the United Nations Sub-
(ommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and named after Sub-
(ommission Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property Restitution, Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro. See Pirdeiro Principles Initiative, I)iSPLACEMENT SOI UTIONS,
http://ww\.displacemnentsolutions.org/?page-id-201 (last visited Aug. 10, 2012)
(summarizing the histol) of the Pinheiro Principles).
42. See Pinheiro Princ., supra note 41, §§ II 4.1, 4.3.
43. Organization of American States, American Convenion on Human Rights,
art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969. O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR] ("1.
Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyncnt to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, foir rcasons of
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established
by law."). Haiti ratified this treaty on September 14, 1977. B-32: American Convetio n on
Human Rights, 1NTLR-A-kl. (OMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, htIp://ww.cidh.oas.org/
lBasicos, inglish/Ilasic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2011).
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Convention protects a right to "use and enjoy" property, except
when it conflicts with "the interest of society." 44 If a government
uses eminent domain, the covenant requires that the
government give owners "payment of just compensation" for
their land. 45
International law also requires that tenure security be
protected without discrimination. 46 For example, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women ("CEDAW") requires men and women to have
equal access to property rights. 47 The Inter-American Court goes
on to assert that equality and non-discrimination are protected
by a shared international sense of justice. 4 This includes
discrimination based on creed, economic status, social
condition, color, and language.49
44. See ACHR, supra note 43, art. 21 (1); see ( lsoYakye Axa Indigenous Community
v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and CostsJudgneint, InterAn,. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No.
125, 1 137 June 17, 2005) (defining this right to property to include "moveables and
inmo vab es, corporeal and incorporeal clenents and any other intangible object
capable of having value).
45. SeeACHR, sorpa note 43, art. 21(2).
46. See PROTECTION CIUSTER HOUSING, LAND ANT) PROPERTY WORKING GROUP,
ISSUE OF THE RENTLRS IN POST-DIsASTLR SCENARIO: PROPOSAL IOR RLDRESSING THLIR
POSITION IN THE HAITIAN HOUSING ASSISTANCF 4 (2011), (-,ilable (t https:i/sites.
google.coin /site/ sheltcrhaiti201 0/files/RENTERS vm FINAL 6 8.docattrcdirects-0
[hereinafter Renters] (noting that discrimination is prohibited by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16, at
1188-89 (designating non-discrimnination as a fundamental principle of human rights).
47. Convention on the Elimination of All Forins of Discrimination Against
Women art. 15(2), 16(l)(h), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 L.L.M. 33 [hereinafter
"CEDAW"] (making provisions tor the state to ensure equal access to property
ownership processes and protecting equal ownership of property in marriage).
48. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory
Opinion OC-18/03, Intcr-Am. (t. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, [ 1-3 (Sept. 17, 2003) ("The
international conmunity is unanimous in considering that the prohibition of racial
discrimination and of practices directy associated wvith it is an obligation erga
onies. '). The Intcr-American Court was established by the ACHR to apply and
interprete the ACHR. See Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights chp. 1, art. 1, O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79), O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 98 (Oct. 1979).
49. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocutnentcd Migrants, Advisory
Opinion, 1-3 (noting that the guarantee of human rights is not dependent on race,
religion, economic status, or social condition); see also VWLSTENDORP, supra note 12, at
175 (emphasizing that tenure security must be constructed without discriminating
against women).
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3. Methods of Protecting Tenure Security after Natural Disasters
Domestically, the right to tenure security can be protected
through formal, informal, and hybrid legal systems.5 Regardless
of which system is used, in order to comply with international
standards, a tenure system must have a nondiscriminatory,
predictable method for asserting tenancy; a transparent,
accessible means of adjudicating conflict of tenure; and a fair
process for eminent domain. In order to be effective, the
system must also be viewed as legitimate. 52 This Section discusses
formal, informal, and hybrid land tenure systems, highlighting
the implications of each approach on disaster recovery efforts.
Lastly, this Section summarizes the arguments in favor of each
system.
Formal Tenany Systems
In a formal tenure system, an ownership claim is
represented in a manner that is recognized and endorsed by the
state. 51 Whether through a title registry, a cadastre, or a system
of notaries, individuals can obtain paper verification of
their claim that is recognized throughout the state. 54
50. See BROWN ET AL., Supra note 18, at 6 (discussing the options to create tenure
security): see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing the
international requirements for a non-discriminatory tenure stein)
51. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 18, at 8 (arguing that clear, equitable, and
predictable administration of resource rights allows the poor and mnarginalized to
access these rights); UN-HABITAT, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting that weak
administration and discriminator) tcnurc processes tend to decrease resilience to
disasters).
52. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 341 (stating that when multiple sstems exist,
thc system that is most lcgitimatc prevails); Fitzpatrick, supra note 20, at 1013 (claiming
that systems will tail if they are not locally accepted).
53. See ZFVFNBERGEN, supra note 19, at 18-20 (sumnarizing the usual
components of a tormal tenure system); DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 6 (emphasizing how
this endorsement translates into something that is trusted by actors outsidc of the
direct community).
54. See Benito Arrunada, The Choice of Titling Systems in Land, 48 J. L. & ECON. 709,
710-13 (2005) (explaining how two tormal tenancy sytems, recording and registration,
give statewide credibility to title claims); DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 6 (observ ing that
those who have secure tenure are more able to get mortgages at banks). A cadastrc is a
government register of the quantity and value of land ownership. BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 167 (3d ed. 1969).
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Counterclaims are resolved by state officials, usually a judge or
registrar. 55
Formal systems can be disrupted after natural disasters
when records are destroyed and individuals involved in the
administration are killed. 56 These systems are usually ill-
prepared to respond flexibly to mass migrations caused by
suddenly unavailable land. 57 In contrast to other tenancy
systems, however, governments' formal systems are often able to
maintain the same level of legitimacy after a disaster. 58
Informal Tenancy Systems
Informal tenancy systems use community
acknowledgement, or norms, rather than a deed conferred by
the state, to provide legitimacy to a claim. 59 Norms are
commonly accepted rules that communities use to organize and
control their interactions. '° A group of economic scholars,
called New Institutional Economists, explain that "norms guide
human conduct and social interactions as much as formal legal
55. See Arrunada, supra note 54, at 710 (observing that property rights are
enforccd by courts); cf ZEVENBERGEN, supra notc 19, at 13, 27 (asserting that courts in
formal systems often do not recognize claims from inlormal systems).
56. See UN-HABITAT, supra notc 16, at 16 (advising that an assssncnt on the
impact of a disastcr must includc an account of all destroyed documcnts); BROWN ET
A,., supra note 18, at 16 (noting that the problems of record destruction include
pcrsonal identification, insurancc papcrs, and proof of addrcss).
57. See UN-HABITAT, supra notc 16, at 66 (noting that individuals with cxpircd or
destroyed documents are at risk of being excluded from shelter and other assistance
programs); Huggins, supra notc 12, at 349 (describing challenges faccd by formal
tcnure systcnms dealing with mass migrations).
58. See UN-HABITAT, supra note 16, at 10-11 (finding that a government is more
likcly to havc thc capacity to rcspond aftcr a natural disastcr than after a prolongcd
conflict); BROWN ETAL., supra note 18, at 12 (obscrving that the formal systcm is more
likely to be recognized by the external community after a disaster).
59. See Stevcn E. Hcndrix, Myths ofProperT Rights, 12 ARIZ.J. INT'l & COMP. L. 183,
188 (1995) (arguing that thcrc arc many ways to show owncrship aside from statc
acknowledgement); Blocher, supra note 20, at 175 (arguing that without social
legitimacy, property rights would bc meaningless).
60. See Maggi Carficld, Participatory Law and Development: Remapping the Locus of
Authority, 82 U. ComO. L. REv. 739, 760-61 (2011) (discussing the interplay between
cultural norms and a firmal legal system); see also JOHN N. DROBAK, NORMS AND THE
LA"W 1 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (describing the rolc that norms play in forming and
influencing the law).
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rules." 61 The norms of the community, they argue, bring
legitimacy to an individual's claim on a piece of land.62
Informal systems can face great uncertainty after a natural
disaster. Mass displacements often result in changes in
communal power structures and challenges to the legitimacy of
the informal system. :  When these traditional power structures
are threatened, there can be period when traditional gender
roles are reinforced and reasserted. 4 Some scholars argue,
however, that informal systems are remarkably resilient and are
often able to reestablish themselves after disruptions more
quickly than government systems can.65
These informal systems usually coexist and overlap with the
state's formal system.6 Individuals who use the informal system
may do so because the costs of participation in the formal system
are too high, they do not understand the formal system, or they
perceive that the community has longer lasting and more
legitimate power than a particular iteration of government6
6 1. I)ROBAK, sopra note 60 (defining New Institutional Economists and describing
their view of norms); see also Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1117-18
(describing African coimmunities that responded negatively to formal tenure systems
because individual ownership was contrary to their value of communal ownership).
62. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 342 (arguing Lhat land tenure cannot be secure
without this form of local legitimacy); see also WESTLNDORP, supra note 12. at 175
(discussing the challenges ol changing systems when the communal norms are not
properly acknowledged).
63. See UN-lABITAT, supra note 16. at 10-11 (explaining that Crisis situations
often force individuals and communities to adopt non-traditional roles to support
suvival); Huggins, supra note 12. at 344-45 (providing examples of how intormal
tenure systems can be impacted by social changes that result rnom ass displacement).
64. See WESTFNDORP, Supra note 12, at 92 (discussing the challenges women face
asserting their property rights after natural disasters); Huggins, supra note 12, at 345
(explaining that women arc more likely to be discriminatcd against when communal
tenancy systems break down).
63. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 339, 341 (emphasizing that the infoirmal system
often has more legitimacy than the government under transition); UN-IABITAT, supra
note 16, at 21-22 (providing suggestions for how to promote resilience after a disaster,
including relying on infirmal systems).
66. See ZEVENBERGEN, supra note 19, at 17-18 (noting that in most cases the
formal state system was built on top of the pre-existing customary system); Huggins,
supra note 12, at 341-42 (emphasizing that the informal systems often outlast the
formal creations).
67. See Hendrix, supra note 59, at 183, 185 (discussing the reasons individuals
choose not to engage in a foirmal titling prograin); Huggins, supra note 12, at 342
(contending tLha the sta[C is often more of a source of tenure insecurity because of
corruption and instability).
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Hybrid Tenancy Systems
Hybrid tenancy systems are designed on the premise that
formal and informal tenancy systems can concurrently provide
the legitimacy needed to protect a valid claim. s Scholars argue
that property norms must be the basis of a property system that
integrates formal and informal rights. 9 Those who advocate for
hybrid systems assert that tenure systems should be motivated by,
and be responsive to, the needs of the poor and vulnerable. 7°1 As
a result, an initial registration for the system is conducted
through a participatory process that includes the poor and
ulnerable. 71 They differ from formal systems because the state
acknowledges the claims as recognized by the community
instead of independently asserting the validity of claims. 72
These hybrid systems offer the most flexibility and,
therefore, resiliency during a natural disaster. 7- Reflections after
other disasters, such as the tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia, attest to
the importance of using a flexible, indigenous system that allows
conflicts to be resolved quickly, while also having the
endorsement of the state. 74
68. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 342 (discussing the overlapping nature of
tenancy legitimacy); ZFVENBFRGFN, supra note 19, at 17-18 (describing the aspects of a
hybrid tenancy system).
69. See Blocher, supra note 20, at 166-67, 171 (arguing that land tenure policy in
Ghana should incorporate custornai practiccs into tihe formal land tenure system);
UN--IABITAT, supra note 16, at 77-79 (arguing that responses after disasters should
acknowledge rights confirmed by lormal and informal sources).
70. See ZEVENBERGEN, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that the actual impacts on the
poor are most important to listcn to, not those intended by idealistic designers); UN-
HABITAT, supra note 16, at 19 (instructing practitioners to construct responses that
focus on the most vulnerablc).
71. See ZLVLNBLR;LEN, supra note 19, at 17-18 (noting that thc data from a pro-
poor enumeration wvill not be as complete as a survey); UNI-HABITA'XT, supra note, 16, at
77-79 (suggesting that disaster responses ftature a comminunit,-led process that
recognizes owncrship with whatevcr documintation is available).
72. See ZEVENBERGEN, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that a hybrid system is destinct
because its registry is commited to thc defacto situation of land claims).
73. See BROWN ETAL., spra note 18, at 12 (cmphasizing that thc combination of
both systems allows for greater resiliency alter disasters); UN-HABITAT, supra note 16,
at 18-19 (highlighting flcxibiliy as kcy to a successful responsc).
74. See, e.g , BROWN ET AL., supra note 18. at 17 (describing thc success of
recognizing the local understanding of tenancy in Indonesia); UNI-HABITAT, supra
note 16, at 80 (highlighting thc success of community generated tenure
documentation in post-[sunamni Indoncsia and noting the pitfalls of a formal tenure
program).
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Discussion of Benefits and Challenges of DiJerent Tenure Systems
Academics and practitioners vigorously debate the
implications and benefits of formal, informal, and hybrid tenure
systems. 75 Because formal tenure systems are rooted in
government administration, many proponents of these systems
are also advocates for the rule of law.76 They argue that shortfalls
of formal systems can be fixed by governance reform. 77
Many of them, including de Soto, suggest that a cadastre is
the only way for poor people to use their land claim to access
credit. 7 They go on to note that though the poor and
vulnerable may be more directly involved in informal systems,
they may not have the power to change or influence the system
if it is biased against them.79 These proponents argue that,
unlike small communities, a strong, transparent state is more
likely to provide a neutral system that is not subject to local
gender, ethnic, or power biases.,s This can be particularly
important in a disaster context when inheritance laws, which are
often rooted in gender power dynamics, are likely to come into
play.81
75. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 340 (noting that there has yet to be a clear
consensus by which tenure systems are best able to protect human rights).
76. See Huggins, supra note 12, at 334-35 (arguing that land rights can only be
protected if rule of law is enforced); Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1 116
(summarizing the arguncnts that inform titling programs).
77. See DL SOTO, supa note 17, at 6-7 (arguing that reforming a formal system
provides an opportunity to ensure that all people are given equal access to land rights);
see also Huggins, supra note 12, at 339 (summarizing the views of de Soto and his
predecessors in the context of transitioning countries).
78. See generaly )E SOTO, supra note 17 (arguing that the primary distinction
between poor and rich nations is the ability for individuals to translate their proper t
assets into credit through a formal tenure system); see also Huggins, supra note 12, at
340-41 (summarizing arguments of proponents oflormal tenure systems).
79. See WESTENDORP, supr#a note 12, at 175 (listing challenges women may lace in
informal systems when female ownership is not acknowledged); UN-HABITAT, supra
note 16, at 14 (discussing the impacts of a discriminato, system on the most vulnerable
people such as women, children, and minority groups).
80. See WLSTENDORP, supa note 12, at 175 (observing that women benefit from
formal systems when they live in sexist communities); UN-HABITAT, supra note 16, at
16 (noting that women and children are more vulnerable to denial of land rights in
communities with informal tenurc).
81. See INTFR-AGENCY STANDING COMMNI., HAITI SHELTER CLUSTER, SUMMARY
RLPORT BY MUNICPALITf 45 (2011), available at https://sitcs.google.col/site/
shelterhai1i201 0/files/1 10831Sunminai yrepor t Inunc.pdf (explaining that
informal systems increase vulnerability for women after disasters); WESTENDORP, supra
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Opponents of formal systems, however, argue that formal
tenure systems fail because they do not recognize underlying
community norms.8 2 Proponents of informal systems further
warn that formal land titling often inadvertently reinforces
discriminatory power structures, as wealthy groups gain formal
rights to land from the government, while poor landholders lose
their claims." They point to studies showing that political elites
often have personal incentives to maintain the inefficiency of a
property system. 8 4 These scholars go on to argue that formal
systems are expensive, technically challenging, and inefficient
for most governments to properly maintain., 5 Advocates of
hybrid systems argue that these systems are the only way for a
claim to maintain legitimacy within a community amidst
external actors,.8 Their critics note, however, that competing
forms of tenancy can also be a source of conflict if not carefully
managed., 7
note 12, at 175 (citing challenges that some women in Africa and Asia face when
claiming land alter their husbands are killed in a disaster).
82. See Jane Regan, Resettlement Plan Excludes Almost 200,000 Families, in TECTONIC
SHIFTS: HAITI SINCL THL EARIHQUAKE 101 (predicting that a formal government
program will lail because it does not recognize the informal secondary tenure rights of
nearly 200,000 Haitian families); Glenn R. Smucker et al., Land Tenure and the Adoption
ofAgricultural Technologi, in Haiti38 (CAPRi, 'Working Paper No. 6, 2006) (arguing that
an expansion of the cadastre system in rural Haiti is inadvisable until such a system
represents local interests).
83. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 20, at 1013 (summarizing experiences from several
formal land titling projects); see also Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1119
(finding that many women lost their tenure claims after titling reforL in Caimeroon
because they did not have resources to register their land).
84. See Blocher, supra note 20, at 176 (contending that elite capture slows
institutional growth and administrative efficiency); ) E SOTO, supra note 17, at 194-206
(discussing ways to avoid elite capture when constructing a formal system).
85. See ZFITNBFRGFN, supra note 19, at 13 (discussing the challenges of most
existing formal systems); Fitzpau-ick, supra note 20, at 1013-18 (arguing that a formal
system is limited by its institutional ability to absorb the Costs of measuring, marking,
valuing, and recording the land).
86. See, e.g., Blocher, sup a note 20. at 167-68, 171 (arguing Lhat land tenure
policy in Ghana should incorporate customm) practices into the formal land tenure
system); UNI-HABITAT, sup a note 16, at 77-79 (arguing that responses after disasters
should acknowledge rights confirmed by formal and informal sources).
87. See UN- LABITAT, supra note 16, at 15 (discussing the propensity for elite
capture when lorum shopping alter disasters); Fitzpatrick, supra note 20, at 1015
(discussing the challenges of multiple tenure systems operating together that result
from formalizing a title system). But see BROWN ET AL.. supa note 18, at 6 (Contending
that multiple legal systems for land tenure allow flexibility during disaster situations).
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B. Haiti
Haiti, a fledgling democracy and the poorest nation in the
western hemisphere, has a long-standing reputation for failing
to provide tenure security.88 Some scholars tie the history of
tenure insecurity to Haiti's litany of economic challenges-from
spending one hundred years paying a "property debt" to France,
to falling victim to corrupt leaders, such as former Haitian
President Jean Claude Duvalier. 9 This Section outlines the
Haitian government's international obligations to protect
tenure security and the national laws that support that goal. The
Section proceeds to describe the forms of tenure used and their
degree of security before and after the earthquake. The Section
also discusses the roles of the multiple actors working in the
post-earthquake reconstruction of Haiti.
1. International Obligations
The Government of Haiti is commited to many
international conventions and principles that represent a strong
obligation to protect tenure security. The Haitian govermnent
signed and ratified the ICCPR and CEDAW, but has failed to
sign ICESCR. Haiti also signed and ratified the ACHR. - 1
88. See HERITFAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 6 (awarding Haiti ten out of one
hundred points in the categol) of protecting property rights and noting Haiti's
position as the poorest nation in the western hemisphere); see also LU(AR, supra. note 9,
at 2 (describing the economic impact of a lailed land tenure system).
89. See generally jeffi-ey M. Brown, Benevolent Assistance or Bureaucratic Burden?:
Promoting Effective Haitian Reconstruction, Self-Governance, and Human Rights Under the
Right to Development, 6 INTERC I TURAI HUM. Wis. I. RFV. 209, 211-13 (2011)
[hercinafter Benevolent Assistance] (describing Haiti's two hundred year history of
development challenges); FAKRNER, supra note 3. at 123-39 (2011) (connecting Haiti's
payment for a debt of "slave property" to France with the country's current
development dileinmas); Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper, Beyond the Duvalier Legacy:
What New 'Arab Spring" Governments Can Learn from Haiti and the Benefits of Stolen Asset
Recovety, 10 NX. U.J. INT'i Hti. Rs. 19, 20 (2011) (reporting that Duvalier stole the
equivalent of approximately 1.7% to 4.5% of Haiti's GDP each year he was in office).
90. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16. 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18. 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13: International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16. 1966 (1978). 993 U.N.T.S. 3. There are no signatories to
the UDHR because it was ratified by the United Nations General Assembly, not created
as a heaty document. UDHR, supra note 14.
91. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACH R].
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According to the Haitian Constitution, treaties that are signed
and ratified become part of domestic law and override
conflicting laws.92 As a result, Haiti has an obligation to protect
against arbitrary interference in land ownership and ensure that
every individual, regardless of gender, has equal access to and
security of tenure. 93 Though Haiti is not bound to the
interpretation of property rights described by the ICESCR, its
obligations under the ACHR require similar protection of
tenure security.94 Thus, Haiti is obligated to protect its citizens'
rights to use property unless it is in "the interest of society" to
compromise that right. 95
As a member of the ACHR, Haiti also has an obligation to
uphold the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. tThe
Inter-American Court and Inter-American Commission
("Commission") hold states responsible for investigating and
preventing human rights violations by outside parties. 97 The
Commission found that "government[s] must prevent and
suppress acts of violence, even forcefully, whether committed by
92. CONSTITUTION OF HALT, Mar. 10, 1987, art. 276-2 ("Once international
treaties or agreements are approved and ratified in the manner stipulated by the
(onstitution, they become part of the legislation of the country and abrogate any laws
in conflict with them."); see also Lisa Davis. Still Trembling: State Obligation Uuder
I -te rtiona Law to End Post-Earthquake Rape in Haiti, 65 U. MIAMI I. REV. 867, 890
(2011). (emphasizing Haiti's obligation to protect women fr om gender-based violence
because its Constitution mandates adherence to ratified treaties and decisions made by
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights).
93. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text (describing a country's
obligations under the 1( (PR, the ACHR, and CEDAN).
94. See sopra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing a state's obligation
to protect tenure security under the ICESCR); see also sup a notes 43-49 and
accompanying text (outlining the obligations to protect tenure security under the
ACHR and (EDXA).
95. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (outlining the obligations to
protect tenure security under the ACHR).
96. See Ititango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-iAn. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 148, [ 209 (Jul. 1,
2006) (using the Guiding Principles to interpret Article 22 of the ltiel- American
Convention); see also Annual Report of the lnterkm. Comm'n on H.R. 2010,
OEA/Ser.L/V/Ii. doc. 5, rev. 1. ch. V, 1[ 73 (March, 7 2011) [hereinafter Annual
Report] (noting that the ituango finding pertains to Haiti in the post-earthquakc
context).
97. See ANDREW (LATiHAM. HUL N RI(,HTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE
ACTrs 424 (2006) (summarizing the means of holding nonstate actors accountable
for human rights abuses).
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public officials or private individuals .... " Further, the Court
held that states can have a duty to "ensure" all the rights
described in the Convention, regardless of who is responsible
for specific violations. 9 As a signatory to the IACHR, the Haitian
govermment must similarly take steps to prevent anyone in their
country from violating its citizens' rights to tenure security.
2. Existing Formal Laws and Regulations
Haiti has also created several formal domestic provisions to
protect tenure security. Most prominently, the Haitian
Constitution mirrors the priorities of international human rights
standards. The Preamble of the Haitian Constitution recognizes
rights "to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in . . .
conformity with" the UDHR.I'll Aiticle 36 of the constitution
directly protects the right to own property,10 2 and Aiticle 22
protects the right to adequate housing.10 " Further, Article 36
permits eminent domain, allowing the state to expropriate
private property if it provides due compensation for the land.10 4
98. Report on tire Situation of Humnan Rights in the Republic of Guatemala. Case
4425, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 38/81, OEA/Ser. /V/II.53, doc. 21 rev. 2
10 (1981) (declaring that Guatemala failed to mcct its ACHR obligations when a union
activist was murdered at the behest of a corporation); see also Yanomani v. Brazil, Case
7615, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Res. 12/85, OEA/Ser. ./Vi1I.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 10-
11 (1985) (holding the Brazilian government responsible for violations of tie right to
life, right to residence and movement, and the right to preservation of health because
it lailed to protect the Yanomami irom the impact of corporate activities).
99. See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgmenti. I Ae-m. (t. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, 172 (July 29 1988) ("What is decisive is... whether the State has allowed the
act to take place without taking measures to prevent it or punish those responsible.");
The Ma)agna (suflIo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgemecnt. InterAm. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 1[1[ 148-49 (Aug. 31, 2001) (finding that the government of
Nicaragua violated the right to property because it lailed to prevent a corporate
takeover of indigenous land).
100. See Davis, supra note 92, at 880 (explaining Haiti's obligation to abide by
decisions of the JACHR); see also sopra notes 94-95 (establishing Haiti's commitment to
thc ACHR).
101. CONSTITUTION OF HAITL Mar. 10, 1987, pabl.
102. Id. art. 36 ("[P]rivate property is recognized and guaranteed. The law
specifies thre manner of acquiring and enjoying it, and thc limits placed upon it.").
103. Id. art. 22 ("The State recognizes tihe right of every citizen to decent
housing .. ").
104. Id. aft. 36-1 ("Expropriation for a public purpose may be effected only by
paymenL or deposit ordered by a court in favor of the person entitled thereto, of fair
compensation established in advance by an expert evaluation.").
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In addition, the constitution states that use of private property
cannot be "contrary to the general interest."10
The Haitian government aims to consistently protect
ownership claims, which it defines as the right to use, enjoy, and
dispose of property, through a series of civil laws. 10 Though the
government allows for sale of land to be valid once the parties
memorialize a price in a promise of sale, Haitian law sets forth a
detailed procedure to publicly acknowledge a transfer of
ownership called sale by genuine deed.107
In the process of buying land with a genuine deed, the
property claim must be recorded in four separate places.108 First,
a buyer and seller must hire a notary to record the transfer in a
preliminary sale agreement and a final bill of sale.109 A notary,
typically a lawyer with additional training, is authorized to veriv-
ownership, draft the document of transfer, and register that
105. Id. art. 36-3 ("Ownership also entails obligations. Uses of property cannot be
contrary to the general interest.").
10i6. ILoi 1962-51 du 28 mat 1962 publication separee et recueil de legislation
orestiire Haitienne [Law 1962-51 of May 28, 1962 Haitian Rural Code] LL MONITEUR,
JOU RNAI OFFICIEI DE LA REPUBI IQUE I)'HAITI [THE MONITOR, THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
OF THF REPUBLIC OF HAITI], July 1974, p. 71-74, art. 21; see also Winston W. Riddick,
Haitiar Immovable Propery Law: A Jqjor Obstacle to Earthquake Recovery and Economic
Developrment, 6 INTLRCULTURAL HUM. RTs. L. RLV. 241, 255 (2011) (providing an
overview of how property rights are addressed in the Haitian Constitution and civil
code).
107. Code civil d'Haiti annote dapres ]a doctrine et lajurisprudence haitiennes et
francaises et references aux auteurs, precede de ]a Constitution de 1918, amendee en
1928 [Annotated Civil Code with Haitian and French jurisprudence and references to
others, preceded by the Constitution of 1918, amended in 1928] Inpr. de "Ia Presse,"
193 1, art. 1367-68 [hereinafter Civil Code] (declaring that both sales are valid by
authentic deed and private seal); see HAITI PROP. I A W WORKING GRP. , A How-To
GUIDE IOR THE LEGALSALL O' PROPERIY IN HAITI 2. 5 (2012) [hereinafter HPL WG]
(noting that though both torins are valid, a genuine deed can only be Contested by
another g'enuine deed).
108. S, OAS, supra note 6, at 10-12 (describing the land taxation, casdatre, and
notary systemns); US AGENC.Y FOR INT'I DEV., COL -NTRY PROFILE: PROPERTY RIGHTS AN)
RLSOURCL GOVLRNANCL: HAITI at 6-7 (2010) [hereinafter US.MD] (summarizing the
process of registering land in Haiti).
109. See Ddcrct 1974-81 du 27 novembre 1969 regimie du notariat [Decree 2974-
82-51 of November 27, 1969 System of Notaries] LL MONITEUR, JOURNAL OFFICILL DL
LA REPU -BIOU F )'HAITI [THE MONITOR, THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF
HAITI], octobre 10, 1974, art. 1, 13. 30-32; see also HPLWG, supra note 107, at 4-10
(observing that even at the preliminm) sale agrecment stage he notaries serve to
review the description of th property and terms of the agreement).
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document within his personal library. 110 Before the agreement is
finalized, the parties must also hire a surveyor to officially record
the boundaries of the land."' The notary and the surveyor are
required to retain the documentation in case there is a laterdispute. 112
Next, in order to authenticate the transfer of property, the
purchasers must also report the land transfer and changes to the
development on the land, to the Direction Generals des Impots
"DGI."113 This is often done by the notary and allows for the
government to levy taxes on the sale." 4 Lastly, Haiti also requires
landowners to report their property holdings to the national
registry, managed by the National Office of the Cadastre
("ONACA") .115 The process of recording property transfers with
110. L)Dcret 1974-81 regime du nottriat [)ecree 2974-82-5 1 System ol Notaries],
art. 7, 12-13 (noting the credentials required fir a notairy and infirmation a notary
must include in a contract of sales); MARTINE DEVERSON, TRANSFLRTS DL BILNS
|MMOBII.1ERS EN HAITI 4 (2011) (on ile with author) (summarizing the legal
obligations of notaries).
111. Dcrct du 26 fivrier 1975 rglcmentant a profession d'arpentcur [Decree
Regulating the Profession of Surveyors] ILE MONITEUR,JOURNA, OFFICTEI DE [,A
REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI [THE MONITOR, THE OFFICALLJOURNAT OF THE RLPUBLIC OF
HAITI] 17 mars 1975, no 21, art. 22-23 (noting that a surveyor is required to do a
formal title search and ask the neighbors about land rights); H PlGW, supra note 107,
at 6-8 (noting that surveyors inust be authorized by the municipality where they are
working).
112. Ddcret 1974-81 regime du notariat [Decree 2974-82-51 System of Notaries],
art. 27 (specifying the lormat of records a notary must maintain); HPL(GW, sur a note
107, at 6-8 (describing the role of notaries and surveoyrs in transfcring land in Haiti).
113. See Ddcrct 1979-32-A du 5 avril 1979 decret abrogeant les ddcrets des 14
septembre 1964 et 4 novembre 1974 en vile d'adopter une nouvelle imposition plus
rationnelle 5 la contribution foncire de la propriete btie [April 5, 1979. Order
Repealing Decrees of 14 September 1964 and November 4, 1974 to Adopt a New Tax
More Rational Contribution to the ILand Tenure and Property Development] ILE
MONITEUR, JOURNAl ()FFICIFI DE [,A REPUBIIQUE 'HAITI [THE MONITOR, THE
OFFC .IALJOURNAL OF THL REPUBLIC OF HAITI] 19 avril 1979, p. 279-81, ch. vi, art. 31
[hereinafter Decree of Land Tenure and Property D)evelopment]; see aSO HPIWG,
supra note 107, at 15-17 (noting that if the bill of sale is not registered with the DGI. it
will not be valid in a dispute against third parties).
114. See HPIIWG, supra note 107, at 15-17 (explaining that the buyer is to pay at
least five percent of the sale price to the DGI).
115. See Decret 1985-87 du le 16 deceinbre, 1985 dcret transfdrant le contri61c de
tutelle dIl'Office National (lu Cadastre ONA(A au Ministcre du Plan [Decree 1985-87
of )ecember 16, 1985 on Transferring Control of the Trusteeship of the National
Oftice of Cadastre ONACA the Ministry of Planning]. See generallY Loi 1807- 004 du le 9
fr1eviere 1807 loi concernant l'Yagriculue CL les raises ell possession [law 1807- 004
February 9, 1807 Law on Agricultre and Property] Ie Moniteur, journal Olficiel de la
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surveyors, notaries, the DGI, and the ONACA, can cost buyers
more than eight percent of the sale price and take more than a
decade.11l
To purchase land from the government, an inhabitant must
lease the land for five years and then purchase the property by
completing a process of 1 11 bureaucratic steps.11 Beginning this
process requires verifying from the DGI, who is responsible for
holding title to all public lands, that the government in fact
owns the land. I IS Alternatively, property can be acquired
through adverse possession after twenty years of open, apparent,
and continuous possession. 9
Secondary forms of tenancy, such as renting, are rarely
recorded with the govermnent. Instead, they are usually
governed by an informal contract between the renter and the
owner.120 When there is a dispute regarding a tenure claim,
Haitian law allows for a judicial hearing. 121 The individual who
feels their land is being unjustly occupied must file an "action of
eviction."12 2 The Haitian national court will have a hearing to
Republique d'Haiti [The Monitor, the Oificial Journal of the Republic of Haiti] le 9
freviere 1807, pp. 206-207 (requiring land registation for all owners).
116. See USAID, supra note 107, at 6-7 (describing the costs to legally transfer
properly); DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 21, 26-27 (estimating that it can take nineteen
years to legally gain ownership of land in Haiti).
117. See FAN, supra note 21, at 26 (observing that the government of Haiti owns
11.1% of arable land); UN--LABITAT, STRATEGIC (CIY\JDE SPATIAI P1ANNING: A
SITLATIONAL ANALs1S OF METROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE 32 (2009) (noting that
approximately forty-five percent of the informal housing in Port-au-Prince belore the
earthquake was on state owned land and that buying land through this process could
take up to nineteen years).
118. See OAS, supra note 6, at 11 (outlining the responsibilities of the D;I);
MORA, (URRENT LAND RIGHTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2011) (on file with author)
(reporting on the DGI's functions after the earthquake).
119. Civil Code, art. 1997, 2039; Riddick, supra note 106, at 267 (citing civil code
generally).
120. See Renters, supra note 46, at 2 (describing Haitian property laws relevant to
the reconstruction); Regan, supra note 82, at 100, 101 (noting that most Haitian
familics pay for rent in twelve or twenty-frou month increclnts). Such an agreement
can be legally dissolved if tire house is destroyed by an Act of God. Civil (ode, art. 1087.
See also Renters, supra note 82, at 3 (noting that the dissolution of the contract after an
act of God applies to rental relationships).
121. Decree 2974-81 regimie du notariat [Decree 2974-82-51 System of Notaries],
art. 32.
122. Civil (ode. art. 115, 124: see also Patrice Flolvilus, Workshop on the Right to
Hlousing in TECTONIC SHIFTS: HAITI SINCE THE EARTHQUAKE, supra note 9. at 136
(emphasizing the lormal legal process available to prevent forced evictions).
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consider evidence of ownership and make a determination of
whether the eviction order should be executed.1 23
3. Security of Tenure in Haiti
Despite the numerous means of formalizing a tenure claim,
the majority of land claims in Haiti, especially in urban areas,
are informal. 24 Even before the earthquake, the formal land
tenure system was so bureaucratic and under-resourced that it
was not used to protect tenure security.12 5 Less than five percent
of the land in Haiti was officially accounted for in public land
records, and men owned the majority of all land. 126
Even though few families used the formal tenure system,
before the earthquake, forced evictions were rare, and families
felt secure enough in their claims to invest in permanent
buildings.1 7 During the last ten years, a large urban migration
produced a shift in Haiti's economy from dependence on
agriculture to a manufacturing and service-oriented economy. 28
By the end of 2009, despite the persistence of the informal
123. Civil Code, art. 115, 124; see also Flovxlus, supra note 122, at 136 (noting that
purported land owners often lack the necessary documentation).
124. See UN-HABITAT, supra note 117, at 5 (noting that over 2.7 million Haitians
live in informal Settlements): FAN, supra note 21, at 27-28 (reporting that the majority
of city dwellers are renters or squatters).
125. See DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 21, 2G-27 (estimating that it could take
nineteen years to legally buy land); US.AD, supra note 108, at 3, 6 (recognizing that
approximately only forty percent of land owners had any documentation of tlieir land
ownership belore the earthquake).
126. See OAS, supra note 6, at 10 (noting lhat the majority of land managed by
ONACA was in greater Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Valley); see also MORA, supra
note 118, at 2 (reporting that most Haitians are not aware of the existence of the
cadastre); FAN, .supra note 21, at 32 (outlining the challenges women face to obtain
formal ownership of their land in Haiti).
127. See UN-HABITAT, supra note 117, at 32-34 (noting that many lamilies in
intormal setdemIncnts use bricks. corrugatcd iron, and concrete flooring in licit
houses): IC(G, supra note 2, at 17 (Conmenting on the degree of tenure security before
the earthquake).
128. See UN-IABITAT, supra note 117 at 27-28 (noting that Haiti is only at the
beginning of its urbanization process); Mena Jagannath ct al., supra note 1, at 12
(discussing the implications ol this migration on the housing sector). Individuals in a
non-agarian economy are more likely to need to prove their land claim beyond an
intimate communi ty. See DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 5-6 (noting the role of credit in a
modern economy).
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system, many signs showed that Haiti's economy was stabilizing
and that new foreign investments were at hand.129
The earthquake in January 2010 dramatically exacerbated
the complexity of land claims in Haiti. The earthquake
simultaneously destroyed most formal land documents and
scattered communities throughout the city. ",1 During the
reconstruction that followed, security of tenure decreased
dramatically as it became difficult to differentiate between
legitimate owners and opportunistic possessors. 13'
Many of the people displaced by the earthquake settled in
the 1,000 camps that spontaneously emerged in Port-au-Prince
and throughout the country.13 2 As late as July 2011, 594,811
people still lived in these camps. 1, Figures from the
International Organization for Migration demonstrate the
magnitude of the problem: sixty percent of the IDP camps were
located on private property; seventy-eight percent of the people
living in the camps were in rented accommodation prior to the
earthquake; and just ten percent had homes that they could
repair or rebuild.134 Post-earthquake surveys show that building
129. See FARvlER. supra note 3, at 51 (attesting that the new investors made it
difficult to lind a hotel room); Kathie Klarreich, Haiti's W'orlking Better, MIAMI HERATI),
Dec. 8, 2009 (observing intiftastucture innovations were motivating increased
invesuncnts).
130. See OAS, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that most land owners kept their
documents in their houses that were destroyed); ICG, supra note 2, at 17 (describing
the scattering of communities throughout the ci ,) .
131. Seejagannath, supra note 1, at 13-14 (discussing the challenges of defending
rights to land when ownership is unclear); 1(G, supra note 2, at 17 (highlighting that
this lack of clarit exists both in areas where international actors are heavily involved
and where they are not).
132. See ICG, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the aftermath of the earthquake);
Memorandum fioin Walter Kaelin, Rcprscentative of the Secretar-Gcncral on the
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, to the U.N. Secretary-(General (Oct. 12-
16, 2010) [herinafter Kaelin] (reporting on the situation in thc camps after the
earthquake).
133. See EVICTION SITUATION, .sp'a( note 3, at I (providing oflicial figures of
displaced individuals in Haiti); see generall ACTED, PRESENTATION AT SHEI.TER
(LLSTLR MEETING: SLRVEY OF THL INTENTIONS OF THE DISPLACED (2011), available at
https:i/sites.google.com /siteishelterhaiti2li0m1inutes Intentionsurve_ Pr%(3%A9s
entationShcltcr(luste r.pdf?att rcdircts-0 (providing survey results of camp
populations).
134. INT'l ORG. FOR MIGRATION, HAITI (AMP COORDINATION (AMP MANAGEMENT
(LLSTLR, REGISTRATION UPDATE: PHASE 2 12 (2011) (describing the impact of
international non-governmncital organizations CINGOs") on displacement); ACTED,
supra note 133 (providing survey results of camp populations).
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tenants are least able to obtain secure shelter because
landowners were more likely to have access to their pre-
earthquake land and building materials. I.5 As of August 2011, a
total of 4,596 permanent houses had been constructed and
94,879 temporary shelters were built.' 3 Meanwhile, rent hikes
and low employment rates had priced many pre-earthquake
renters out of the market.1 3,
The IDP camps attracted the majority of humanitarian
attention, and until recently the international community put
less emphasis on rebuilding the pre-earthquake
neighborhoods. 138 International non-governmental
organizations ("INGOs") allege that the response emphasized
building shelters in the camps instead of repairing houses in
neighborhoods because there was a lack of international
expertise for home repair. 139 In August 2011, nearly a year and a
half after the quake, Haitian President Michel Martelly
presented a plan to focus efforts on six camps, and to return the
135. See Kate Crawford ct al., Coordination and the Tenure Puzzle in Haiti,
H-NIANITARIAN FXCH. MAG., Oct. 2010, a ailable , thttp:ww odihpn. org/ report.asp?
id-3148 (speaking to the challenges of land tenure after the quakc); Renters, supra
note 46, at 1 (noting that the initial ftcus on uansitional shelter or reconst ruction of
houses favored land owners).
136. See INTER-AGENCY STANDING CONMM., supra note 81, at 45 (summarizing a
smuvcy of shelter inahbitants by municipality); 1CG, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting the
challenges of creating long-term tenure security are not going to be found by focusing
on internally displaced people ("IDP") camps).
137. See Renters, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that most renters paid their entire
year's rent before the 20 1) earthquake); ACTION AI), supra note 4, at 6 (reporting on
thc high rent increases).
138. See Kaelin, supra note 132. 25 (contending INGOs prefer camps because
the needs are most visible and the beneficiaries can be easily reached); Interview by
author with member of sub-clusteir Working Grp. on Hous., Land, and Prop. Rights
(Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Working Group Interview 11] (stating that evictions were not
the business of humanitarian organizations because they wvere not related to the
earthquake).
139. See OxiAM1, supra note 5, at 15 (claiming that if housing repairs were
prioritized earlier, hundreds of thousands of IDIs wvould have been able to return
home); Kaclin, supra note 131, J[ 15-16 (stating that slow rcconstruction is linked to
disagreement among international organizations on standards for tconstrution). But
see Getting 'wttian s u  of Ca rps, Into Shelter and Into Their Comunte, COOP. HOUS.
FOUN) &July 9, 2010), http://wNw.chfinternaional.org/nodc/ 34398 (describing
(HF's work, focusing oin early return to neighborhoods and dealing with tenure issues
through community dialogue).
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population of those camps to their original sixteen
neighborhoods. 140
Tenure security and transparency of title has been a
challenge from the beginning of the humanitarian response and
continues to cause problems during reconstruction. 141 The
scarcity of land after the earthquake magnifies the impact of
tenure insecurity.142 Thousands of internally displaced people
have been forcibly evicted from their temporary homes and only
a week after the earthquake, state officials and those claiming to
be property owners were driving informal camp inhabitants off
the land. 143 In addition, the seemingly endless rubble has
reduced space for reconstruction.144 This tenure insecurity has
impacted physical security and economic innovation .1 45
140. See (overnment of Haiti, Presentation at Shelter Cluster Meeting: 16/6 (Aug.
16, 2011), available at httpS://Sites.google.coi/sitc/shelterhaiti2010/minutes
/PrC(3% AoscntationpowerpointhffancaisC(IRH22j uillet201 1.pdfattredirects-0
(describing the president's neighborhood plan to return IAN to their pre-earthquake
neighborhoods); Regan, supra note 82, at 101 (emphasizing that the governlent plan
does not offer housing options for those who were renters before the earthquake).
141. See ONXAMI, sopra note 5, at 15 (describing the impact of poor tenure security
on reconstruction); ICG, supra note 2, at 17-18 (noting the challenges of creating long-
term tenure security will not be found by focusing on IDP camps).
142. See Camp Benediction, et al., R-bli of Haii Subnission to the V ited Nations
Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights Council: Right to Housing, [[ 3-5, 12th Sess.
(2011) [hereinafter Benediction] (claiming that evictions arc in part a result of tenure
problems belore the quake); Kaelin, supra note 132, 45 (describing the beginning of
forced evictions).
143. See Annual Report, supra note 96, ch. 5. 1[ 42 (emphasizing that evictions
were by force, without notice, and without following the procedure of Haitian law);
KaClin, supra note 132, [ 45 (noting that the initial evictions were as early as March
2010).
144. See OTXAMI, supra at 5, at 14 (noting if all the rubble wvere loaded into trucks
and the trucks were placed end to end the line of trucks would extend haitWay around
the world); Mario Joseph & JeCna Shah, Combating Foced Evictions in Haitis IDP Camps,
in TECTONIC SHIFTS: HAITI SINCE THE EARTHQUAKE, .spra note 9, at 13 8-39 (noting
their surprise that comnmunities were not quicker to mobilize against thC physical and
economic insecurity they faced).
145. Seejagannath et al., supra note 1, at 15-16 (linking "shocking" levels of
gender-based violence to "insecurity" of those living in IDP camps); see also Memoranda
fr1om Enterprise Fund DClegation to SCnator Richard Lugar, Haiti Trip Report 3-4
(May 5, 2011) (reporting that investment foreign levels have been abysmal in Haiti due
to actual and perceived barriers to investment). In an interesting parallel to the issue of
tenure security, the intLernational response to the rapes in camps was criticized for
ignoring the work of grassroots organizations and not consulting beneficiaries while
crafting a response. See, e.g., Amanda Klasing, Haiti: After the Shock, Building a Rights-
Respecting Future. JURIST Jan. 9, 2011), hLtp://w.hnr.org/news/2011/01/09/haiLi-
after-shock -building-rights-respecting-fitre (highlighting that the voices of victims
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The lack of tenure security has attracted local, national, and
international attention. The Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons,
Walter Kaelin, wrote a memorandum in October 2010
describing how the Hatian people were displaced and evicted
without consideration for their property rights.146 In November
2010, the IACHR requested that the Haitian government issue a
moratorium on evictions and take steps to ensure a secure living
environment. 147 Further, the local and international media
continue to cover the forced evictions and the impact of tenure
insecurity on the speed of reconstruction. 14s
I. HAITIS FAIL URE TO FULFILL LY\TENA TIONAL
OBLIGATIO7NS
Part I showed that since the Januar-y 2010 earthquake, the
Haitian government has not fulfilled its obligation to provide
tenure security for many of the earthquake victims. This Part
investigates how three actors influence the Haitian
government's ability to fulfill these human rights obligations.
Part IL.A discusses how the Haitian government's
implementation of the formal legal system impacts the right to
tenure security. Next, Part II.B explores how tenure security is
created by community norms in Haiti and how this affects the
right to tenure security. Lastly, Part II.C looks at how
international actors impact tenure security. For each actor, the
Section considers the method used to access tenancy, the
were not including in reconstruction planning); Davis, supa note 92. at 879
(describing an exemplary failure when noting that international organizations gave
women battel) powered flashlights when the women could not afford batteries).
146. See Kaclin, supra note 132. 22 (providing official witness to the evictions).
147. See ILetter from Elizabeth Abi-Mershed, Assistant Exec. Sec'y, Inter-Am.
CoLin'n H.R., to Bureau des Advocates Internationaux (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
http:/ ijdh.org/archives/ 17716: see also Annual Report, supra note 96. h, V. 49
(calling on the Government of Haiti to prevent additional forced evictions).
148. See generally Tint Padget & Jessica Desvarieux, Evicting Haiti's Homeless: How
Land Tenre Hanpers Recover7, TIME (Sept. 23. 2010), htLp:/ /Nww.tinle.coul/time
/world /article 0,8599,2021206,00.html (reporting on the impact of evictions on
reconstruction). See also Janct Reitman, Houw the World Failed Haiti. ROLLING STONE,
Aug. 4 2011. at 58-71 (reporting oil the famlure of the international community to
provide secure land for displaced people).
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mechanism used to arbitrate disputes, and the means of
balancing overriding public interest.1 49-
A. Haiti's Limited Implementation of Formal Law
1. Method to Assert Tenancy: Cadastre System
There is a systematic failure of all three of Haiti's formal
recording systems due to inconsistent funding, low capacity, and
weak political will. 151 The National Office of the Cadastre
("ONACA") is poorly staffed and insufficiently funded. 5 The
Direction Generales des Impot ("DGI"), which has a sparse
record of land transactions, keeps most of its records on
handwritten documents and electronic spreadsheets without an
index by party name.152
The limited and irregular recording by these offices means
that the majority of Haitians do not have access to secure tenure
through the formal registration systems.15- Some argue that the
high cost and information barriers to participation result in a
formal system that discriminates against the poor. 154 For
example, the long process of registration is impractical, if not
impossible, for a residential applicant to complete on their
own. 155 Further, this registration system fails to account for
149. See sapra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (summarizing the basic
elements necessmar to protect tenure security).
150. See e.&, OAS, sopra note 6, at 4 (observing the lack of records and lack of
consistent methods tor recording information in all of Haiti's land registry systems);
USAID, supra note 108, at 7 (noting that Haiti "lacks a comprehensive, functional
system for recording land ownership").
151. See OAS, sup a note 6, at 10 (noting that the national cadastre had an
operating budget of just over USS100,000 annually); MORA, supra note 118. at 1-2
(reporting the ONACA is unable to attract well trained staff).
152. See OAS, supra note 6, at 11 (describing the DGI's antiquated system); see also
Riddick, su,a note 106, at 260 (describing the limitations of DGI's system).
15. Se FAN, supra note 21, at 29-30 (recognizing the lack of participation of the
majority of Haitians also means that the progriam has less legitimacy in the eyes of the
majorit) of Haitians).
154. See upra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the propensity for
formal tenure to disfavor the poor).
155. See WORLD BANK & INTIL FINANCL (ORP.. DOING BUSINESS IN HAITI 20
(2010), available at http:i/ww,, .businessinhaitihcorn/imagesistories/pdf-filesidoing_
business_2010_haiti.pdf (noting that on average, it takes more than 400 (lays to register
land); DL SOTO, supra note 17, at 21 (Contending tha[ it can Lake as long as nineteen
years to buy land firom the government).
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derivative rights to land, such as renting. 156 Consequently, the
registry excludes alnost everyone except business owners and
elites. 157
2. Access to Adjudication: Court System
As discussed above, for tenure to be secure it must be
possible to resolve disputes in a just and transparent manner. 15
If a Haitian citizen has a land dispute, she has a right to access
the Haitian court system.1 59- In practice, however, the wait to
have a land dispute before a judge can take as long as five
years.I °In addition, entry to the court is limited to those who
possess formal identification and understand French.'6' Further,
most Haitians lack the funds necessary to hire legal
representation, and are also unable to pay the bribes often
necessary to see their case progress. Though the Haitian Bar
Association provides legal aid services in all of the courts, it has
been overwhelmed since the earthquake with cases of lost
156. See FAN, spr#a note 21, at 4-5, 27-28 (noting that sixty-five to seventy-five
percent of the displaced people were renters befoire the earthquake and were not
registered in the cadastre system); Renters, sprpa note 46, at 2 (contending that tenure
reform would be ineffective if it (lid not take into account the rights of renters).
157. See Mora, sup a note 118. at 2 (observing that the majority of poor Haitians
are not even familiar with the existence of a cadastre); see also UN-HAIBITAT, sarpa
note 117, at 33-34 (observing that the preponderance of inoirmal ownership in Por-
au-Prince is in part due to the barriers that exist tor poor and less-educated people to
participate).
158. See supa notes 50-52 and accompanying text (outlining the fundamentals
for a system to realize the international obligations of tenure security).
159. See upra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the Haitian laws related
to court procedures); Jagannath et al., sup a note 1 at 11-14 (detailing cases authors
brought on behalf of internally displaced people in Haitian courts); USAID, swpra note
108, at 8 (noting that this is olten an option of last resort).
160. See OAS, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that betore the earthquake, the average
land property disagreement took five years to resolve by tihe courts); see also USAID,
supra note 108, at 8 (noting that the destruction of court buildings in recent years
contributes to the delays).
161. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, KLEPING HAITI SAFL: JLST1CE RLEFORM 7 (2011)
[hereinafter ICG 11] (noting that since ninety percent ol the population speaks Haitian
Creole, courts operating only in French deny access to a majority of the population);
see also FAN, supra note 21, at 30 (reporting that foty percent of Haitians lack
identification).
162. See 1CG Ii, supra note 161, at 7 (discussing the practical barriers that limit
access Lo jusice in Haiti); see alsoJagannath CL al., supra note 1, at 11-12 (outlining the
barriers most Haitians face interfacing with the judicial proces).
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documents and inheritance. 1 , Finally, some Haitians have such
a strong lack of trust in the govermnent's ability to rule against
powerful landowners that they avoid the courts.1 4 While access
to the courts is generally exclusive, there are some recent cases
where the courts have protected earthquake victims from
displacement. 65
Although officially condemned by the govermnent, many
forced evictions of informal camps are by local police and other
public officials, but without consultation with the courts.16 In at
least one case, a city mayor has ordered the destruction of a
camp.1 7 There are also many instances when the police has
failed to protect people from being forcibly displaced.b8 There
is no evidence that the government officials verified the tenure
of the land they were clearing. 9 Those following the evictions
163. See FAN, sopra note 21, at 20 (reporting that the head of the Bar Association
of Port-au-Prince thinks there is greater need to inform the population about their
rights in the court process); ICG I, supra note 161, at 7-8 (discussing the limited legal
aid structure in Haiti).
164. See Jagannath et al., supra note 1, at 13-14 (noting that many IDPs were
reluctant to join in court cases because they did not think the court was powerful
enough to stop the land owners); see also ICG 11, supra note 161, at 9 (emphasizing that
lack of judicial independence is central to mistrust of the judicial system).
165. Seejagannath et al., sapra note 1, at 14-15 (describing recent successes in the
court process); see also Interview with legal clerk of Inst. for Justice & Democracy
("IllD") (October 2011) [hereinafter Legal Clerk 1] (on file with author) (emphasizing
that by law, evictions can only be enlorced wvith a court order).
166. See Kaelin, supra note 132, 1[ 22 (emphasizing that police officials were
involved in some of the evictions); Annual Report, supra note 96, ch. V, 44 (reporting
that government officials wvere inolved in some of the earliest evictions). The President
of Haiti issued a decree in 2011 putting a moratorium on all forced evictions and in
April 2010 requiring private citizens to allow IDPs to live on their land during the
humanitarian crisis. See ICG, sopra note 2, at 8 (noting that many land owners did not
heed the government's decree).
167. See generaly Beverly Bell, Haitian iwayor' Office Vows to Destroy All Refugee
Camps. Launches Violent Campaign, ()THFR WORLDS (May 27, 2011), http:/w/v w .
oth cw rldsai, Iossible.org/another-haiti-possible'haitian-mailaors- oftic-Nows-dcstr0y-
all-reftgee-camps-launches-violent-camipaig (dc ribing forced evictions in Delmas). See
also Relocation, Relocation, Relocation-Haitian S yle: Iictim Beone Vicins Agai. UJ)H (uly
12, 2011), http: //ijdh.org/archives/ 20019 (reporting on forced evictions in Delnas).
168. See Annual Report, supra note 96. ch. V, 1[1[ 42-43 (chronicling incidents
when police were informed of forced evictions but did nothing to intervene); ILegal
Clerk I, supra note 165 (describing thre lack of police intervention during evictions).
169. See Working Group Interview Ii, supra note 138 (noting the lack of
government investigations); Florvilus, supra note 122, at 136 (reporting that most
evictors choose to hire bandits to forcibly remove people rather than use the court
process). But see.Jagannath e al., supra note 1, at 14 (reporting [hat some prosecutors
have threatened to bring charges against mayors involved in these forced evictions).
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note that these public officials discriminated against the
temporary tenure holders, calling them squatters, in favor of the
purported long-term tenure holders without actually verifying
tenancy. 170
3. Weighing Public Good: Executive Orders
Another element of how government administration
impacts tenure security is how the government has used the
power of eminent domain after the earthquake. The ACHR
allows the government to seize land if it is necessary for the
public good and the government provides just compensation. 171
There were several instances of the Haitian government using
eminent domain after the earthquake in Haiti, but there does
not appear to be a consistent means of assessing public benefit
or conferring compensation. 172 The most prominent use of
eminent domain took place on March 22, 2010 when Haitian
President Rene Preval issued a decree allocating a large plot of
unoccupied land on the outskirts of Croix des Bouquets for
emergency shelter.17- Approximately 30,000 families moved with
the assistance of international aid agencies to this plot. 174 The
government, however, did not compensate the original land
owners for taking their land.175 The government also failed to
170. See Annual Report, supra note 96, ch. V, 47 (noting that evictions against
tepory tenure holders were often carried out with Haitian authorities but without
verilying ownership through the Haitian legal system); see also Florvilus, supra note 122,
at 136 (urging those with land disputes to utilize the court systen); supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text (noting that tenure security can include claims to partial and
full access).
171. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining the legal basis fir
eminent domain in tihe ACHR).
172. See Expropriation de terrains, SOSHAITI (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:37 PM), http:/iw Nw-.
soshaiti.inf/ gouverncment- haitien /haiti-expropriation-de- terrains.fhim [hereinafter
Expropriation] (decreeing plots of land defined by GPS coordinates fir government
use); Reitman, supra note 148, at 58 (describing the eminent domain use at Corail).
173. See generallY Exprpriatio , s pra note 172 (outlining the government decree);
see also Annual Report, supra nowe 96, ch. V. 1[ 45 (describing the official actions related
to the plot of land).
174. See Annual Report, supra note 96. ch. V. [ 45-46 (explaining the
developments at Corrail); Human Rights Situation Hearing. supra note 7 (noting that
because so little land wvas registered belore the earthquake, it is often unclear whether
those pressuring the government actually have valid legal title or propert) rights).
175. See ICG, supra note 2. at 1(0 n.83 (explaining lta[ the lack of compensation is
in part due to a disagreement between the government and the landowners on how to
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protect those who moved into the area when the original
landowners complained about their lack of compensation.1 76
4. Impact on Human Rights Obligations
The Haitian government's administration of land laws
impacts how Haitians are able to access tenure, resolve disputes,
and anticipate eminent domain. In reviewing the Haitian
government's performance of tenure administration, it becomes
clear that the Haitian govermnent has not been able to fulfill its
obligation to provide tenure security through its formal
system177 The cadastre's limited coverage means that numerous
Haitians do not have their claim on property reinforced by the
legitimacy of the state. 178 The bureaucratic hurdles of
registration further discriminate against the poor and secondary
tenure holders. 1 9 The general inaccessibility of the court
process also decreases tenure security and limits Haiti's ability to
protect its citizens from arbitrarily having their property
removed.'" Further, by allowing state actors to participate in
forced evictions, the Haitian government is violating its
obligation to uphold individual rights to claims on property.81
This use of executive power undermines tenure security because
it fails to offer proper compensation to the titleholder that is
being asked to forgo their claim on the land.1 2 In so doing, the
value the land); Reitnan, supra note 148 (noting that the land was far ftom meaningful
access to livelihood, water, or markets).
176. See Annual Report, supra note 96, ch. V. 46 (reporting that after the land
owners voiced discontent, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance issued a decree
that buildings erected in the area without approval could be torn down without
notice).
177. See generaly Annual Report, supra note 96, ch. V (assessing the ability of
Haiti's formal system to provide tenure security); Kaelin, supra note 131 (noting the
limiitations of the formal system).
178. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (describing the limited
coverage of the formal system).
179. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (noting how it is more
difficult for poor people to complete the formal process).
18. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (highlighting the barriers to
accessing the courts); see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing the
international right to nondiscriminatol) access to tcnure security).
181. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (noting that protection of
tcnure security must be non-discrinminatory).
182. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (documenting that Haiti's use
of eminent domain did not include adequate compensation); see a so supra notes 44-45
1858 FORDHAM INETERNATIONAL LAIWJOURNAL [Vol. 35:1824
Haitian government is falling short of its obligation in the
AHCR to provide just compensation.8I
B. hformal Sstem Conjfrs Tenure with Limited Recognition fiom the
Hlaitian Government
1. Method to Assert Tenancy: Community Agreement and
Notaries
The majority of Haitians, particularly residents of Port-au-
Prince, transfer land through a customary law process using
notaries or oral agreements. I, 4 Customary ownership usually
represents land that was bought or inherited without updating a
title in the formal system. 115 As a result, the majority of
customary ownership before the earthquake was based on a
communal memory of who owned which property.18 6 In some
cases, before buying land, individuals consult notaries from their
neighborhood to provide verification of the previous owner's
claim., 7 Because there are so few formal titles registered, the
notaries, when not able to provide certification of title, would
instead provide verification from their knowledge of the land
and personal records188 Notaries are extremely powerful but do
not have to answer to a higher authority. As a result, there can
and accompanying text (documenting Haiti's international obligation to provide
adequate compensation).
183. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (outlining the Haitian
government's obligations under the AHRC).
184. See USAID, supra note 108, at 5-6 (noting that customary ownership is usually
based on individualized ownership); Smucker et al., supra note 82, at 11 (describing the
forms of land tenure in Haiti).
185. See Smucker et al., supra note 82, at 9 (summarizing the forms of land
ownership in Haiti); FAN, supra note 2 1, at 32 (noting that courts usually give half of
inherited property to the surviving spouse and the other half is partitioned among the
children).
186. See Smucker et al., supra note 82, at 11-12 (noting that the informal title is
not necessarily viewed as less secure than the formal title by community members);
supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of community
normns in giving legitimacy to land claims in informal tenure systems).
187. See UN-HABITAT, supra note 117, at 32 (noting that the use of notaries is
more common in wealthier areas of the cit); Riddick, supra note 106, at 264-65
(discussing the importance of the notar) system in Haiti).
188. See OAS supra note 6, at 11 (stating that it is difficult to have consistency
between the 500 notaries in the county).
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be corruption, or at least extreme inconsistency of record
keeping.18 9
The earthquake largely disrupted this system as more than
a million people were displaced, thousands of buildings
collapsed, and many land markers were destroyed. 19-) Though
little information exists documenting the extent of the problem,
the disruption in the community memory has increased the
tenure insecurity and the opportunity for forceful capture.' -
This is particularly challenging for those who had secondary
tenure rights before the earthquake, such as renters. 192 Some
scholars suggest, however, that the informal tenancy system in
Haiti has always been very reactive and flexible.' -h,
2. Access to Fair Adjudicationancy
The majority of informal property conflicts are first
mediated within the neighborhood.194 If that is not successful,
189. See FAN, supra note 21, at 30 (noting that the notaries are given more power
after the earthquake because there are fewer who can balance their authority); OAS,
supra note 6, at 11 (describing notaries as ad hoc record keepers often plagued by
fiaud).
190. See FAN, .supra note 21, at 4-5 (providing a list of how the large number of
infirmal land holders complicates the rebuilding process); see also INTER-AGENCY
STANDING CO MM., supra note 81, at 45 (emphasizing that infoirmal tenure systems may
have more challenges determining ownership after a disaster than lormal systems).
191. See UN-IABITAT, supra note 16, at 99 (noting that one of the benefits of the
participatol) enuncration exercise would be a better understanding of how
information tenure systems are working after the earthquake); supra notes 63-65
(describing the challenges of re-cstablishing communal memol) after mass
displacement and death).
192. See Renters, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that most renters paid their annual
rent in advance of the Janua) 2010 earthquake); ACTION AI), .supra note 4, at 6
(reporting lhat many land owners have taken advantage of this situation and rental
prices have soared since the earthquake).
193. See Smucker et al., supra note 82, at 37 (summarizing his research on land
tenancy in rural Haiti); UN-HABITAT. supra note 117, at 33-34 (noting lhat before the
earthquake, even though most tenure was informal, there wvas not a strong sense of
insecurity).
194. See.Jagannath et al., supra note 1, at 12-14 (emphasizing that most IDPs do
not consider using the formal justice system because they have only resolved these
disputes informally in the past): Interview with Darlcns Hyppolite. Land and Prop.
Rights Consultant. in Haiti (Dec. 13, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter
ly ppolite] (noting that informal negotiations are usually mediated by parents).
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individuals can appeal to the formal court system. 195 It is
unlikely, however, that either party will have all of the
documents necessary to be officially recognized by the courts,1 1
The potential for discrimination with inheritance claims is
particularly important in the informal system.'1 7 Though in the
formal system inheritance is gender neutral, in customary
practice, women may find it difficult to access the land that they
believe they own.'"% Inheritance issues, which are numerous
because of the loss of life in the earthquake, leave women and
children particularly vulnerable when no clear means of
adjudication exists. 99
3. Weighing Public Good
Haitian communities assert their view on eminent domain
in two very different ways. The first is through forced evictions
spurred by individuals claiming to own land where IDPs have
settled. 21 These actions are often carried out by well-paid
former policemen and thugs .201
195. See Hyppolitc, supra note 194 (describing the usual steps towards dispute
resolution); see also Florvilus, supra note 122, at 136 (imploring I)PIs to use the lormal
court system for their protection even if their claim to land is informal).
196. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (discussing necessary
documentation for the court process).
197. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the challenges
women and minorities face when informal tenancy is used in communities that do not
recognize their rights).
198. See FAN, sopra note 21, at 32-33 (noting that while a "legal" wvife may be able
to recover her share of inherited land, an unregistered wife, or placge, is unlikely to
receive anything); see also WESTENDORP, supra note 12, at 172-73 (citing challenges
some women face claiming land if their husbands art killed in a disaster).
199. See FAN supra note 21, at 19-20 (discussing the challenges of resolving land
disputes alter the earthquake); see also Huggins, sopra note 15, at 351 (noting that there
is often a tension in weak states bctween the states responsibility to protect tenure
security and the state's limited legitimacy when addressing community held claims).
200. See Florl 1us, spr#a note 122, at 136 (noting that purported land owners olten
lack actual documentation); Joseph & Shah, supra note 144, at 142 (reporting that in
one case when a would-be evictor was confronted with the law, he stopped his forced
pursuit).
201. See Annual Report, supra note 96. ch. V. 1[1[ 46-48 (reporting that the
brutality of the evictions included destroying property and killing children); Legal
Clerk I, supra note 165 (describing the use of thugs and retired police).
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In contrast, there are also popular movements demanding
recognition for housing and property rights.2 112 A forum with
representatives from thirty-five temporary camps called for
parliament to pass legislation supporting their constitutional
right to housing and to sign and ratify the CESCR.2 3 In addition
to filling the streets with protests, some leaders from this
movement have also appealed to the Haitian Senate to protect
housing rights and better manage resources spent on housing214
4. Implications for Human Rights Obligations
Proponents of the informal system in Haiti argue that it
allows a greater number of Haitians to have some form of tenure
rights because the formal system is too slow and costly to be
utilized.2 0 They also suggest that the flexibility of the informal
system helps prevent total exclusion of individuals who lost their
documentation during the earthquake.2°0 Though the informal
system has been the most prominent system in Haiti for decades,
practitioners and scholars note that its ability to provide tenure
202. Se. e.g, ACTION Air, THE 'JE NAN JE' HATI LAND AN) HOUSING RIGHTS
(AMPAIGN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2011), available at http:/www.actionaid.org/haiti/
publicationsje-nane-jecampaign-oveiw-0) (outlining a popular platlorm for land
rights); Joseph & Shah, sup-a note 144, at 139-42 (describing the organizing and
training of an emerging housing movement).
203. See Final Resolution. Int'! Forum on the Crisis oJ'Housing in Haiti, INT'l AIl J ANCE
0O' INHABITANTS (May 30, 2011), http:/iww.habitants.orginewsiinhabittnts of
anericas/ final-resolution international forun on the crisis of housing in haiti
(reporting on the effort to lobby Parliament); see also Alexis Erkert, 1e are Tired oj
Living U nder Tents, OTHER WORIDS (Oct. 6, 2011), http:/iwww.other-orldsarepossible.
org/anoth er-haiti-possible /we-are-tired-living-uder- tents (chronicling an ongoing
demand for housing rights irom those in I)P camps).
204. See Letter from Chavannes Charles, President, Management (onmittce,
GARR, and Reyneld Sanon, Gencral Co-ordinator, FRAKKA. to the Haitian Senate
Committee on Education, Youth, and Sports, The Condition of People in Camps and
the Housing Situation in Haiti After the Earthquake form Collective of Organisations
Defending Housing Rights (Sept. 15. 2011), available at http: //ww.haitisupportgroup.
org index.php-option-com-content&view-article&id-534:hoiising-coalitioni-sibmits-
seven-clear-demands-to-senate&catid-l:lates-news&teiid-141 (describing the lobby
for housing rights at the scnatc).
205. See I)W SOTO, sopra note 17, at 21, 26-27 (explaining the long period of time
and finances required to utilize the current foirmal system); Smucker et al., supra note
82, at 36 (suggesting that the informal system in Haiti did not require tihe bureaucratic
delays seen in the formal system).
206. See Smucker et al., sup a note 82, at 36 (arguing that informal tenancy in
Haiti tends to pragmatically prioritize food securi[y and basic access over proprietary
concerns).
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security has severely declined since the earthquake.207 Because
customary norms rewarded those who remained on the land,
those who were displaced after the earthquake could not claim
their informal right to property as easily.208
The amorphous nature of the informal system also makes it
difficult for the Haitian government to fulfill its human rights
obligation to protect tenure security within the informal
process.20 9 Because the community, not the government, has
legitimacy within the system, an informal system can undermine
the government's ability to protect citizens' rights 10 Further, it
is difficult for the government to confirm tenure status to
institutions outside of the community, such as banks, when the
community has been displaced. 11 For example, if a neighbor
witnessed a transfer of land from an uncle to his nephew ten
years before the earthquake, and then all of the parties involved
were displaced to different camps, it would be very difficult for
even the government to verify that the nephew was the true
owner of the land. Though the Haitian govermment has an
obligation to prevent arbitrary evictions, it may be difficult to
enforce this responsibility for communities that have chosen to
opt out of the formal system completelI 12
207. See upra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing the state of tenure
securit) before and after the earthquake).
208. See Smucker et al., spra note 82, at 12 (noting that individuals who migrate
or mairry outside of the area might have less validity making a claim on land); cf
Renters, supra note 46 (emphasizing the lack of tenure securit) for renters); see also
supra notes 142-43 (discussing the significant number of evictions).
209. See UN-HABITAT, PARTICIPATORY ENUMERATION EXERCISE: PRQJFCT
PROPOSAL 2 (2010) (noting the limitations of the formal government protecting land
claims that have not been formally registered); see also Regan, supra note 82, at 101
(noting how the government's formal plan for resettlement suruggled to take into
account those who did not have formal tenure rights before the earthquake).
210. See Regan, supra note 82, at 10 1-02 (reporting that government attempts to
assert tenancy are occasionally thwarted by individuals who claim informal rights to the
land); Uf Huggins, supa note 12, at 342 (noting the challenges of a government giving
legitimacy to the informal system).
211. See, e.g , DE SOTO, supra note 17, at 5 (discussing the pitfalls of an informal
system and the challenges of the government interacting with that system).
212. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (outlining the government's
obligation to protect citizens from forced evictions); see also supra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text (explaining some of the challenges the government faces in trying
to protect rights in the midst of the informal system).
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C. The T'arious Methods f/r International Actors to Confer Land
Tenure
International actors have such strong power within Haiti
that they can record, verify, and assert tenure.2 3 There are over
10,000 international humanitarian organizations currently
operating in Haiti214 The United Nation attempts to coordinate
these efforts through a "cluster" system.215 In addition, the
government of Haiti monitors the recovery and reconstruction
through the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission ("IHRC"). 216
The IHRC was intended to cede control of the reconstruction
after eighteen months .2 17
Though there is widespread acknowledgement of the
tireless efforts by international actors, the seemingly slow
213. See FARMER. supra note 3, at 214-15 (discussing some of the criticisms
weighed against international organizations operating in Haiti alter the earthquake);
Kcvin Edmonds, NGOs and the Business of Poverty in Haiti. in TECTONIC SHIFTS: HAITI
SINCE THE EARTHQLAKE, supra note 9, at 63, 63-64 (suggesting that the power of NGOs
is such that it has supplanted Haitian citizens' rights to sell-determination).
214. See Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 1156 n.59 (describing
international actors working in Haiti); Mark Schuller. Invasion or Infusion?
UrVderst(unding the Role oj NGOs in Contemporay Haiti, 13 J. HAITIAN STUDS. 96, 98-99
(2007) (describing a long history of international NGOs operating in Haiti with mixed
results). This Note refers to international non-governmental organizations operating in
Haiti, including UN agencies, as IN)GOs. Donor agencies that usually represent
governments are refeirred to as such. The term "intcrnational organizations" is used to
encapsulate both NGOs and donor agencies.
215.See ANDREA BINDER & FRANCOIS GRU NMvAID, IASC CLUSTER APPROACH
EVAXL ATIO 2ND PHASE, COUNTRY STUDY: HAITI 7, 19-20 (2010) (explaining that the
cluster approach divided organizations into topical designations, and finding that the
system "was weak on ownership and connectedness, demonstrated only a low level of
accountability"); Interview with Lilianne Fan, former sub-cluster coordinator, 'Working
Group on Housing, Land, and Prop. Rights in Haiti (Oct. 15. 2011) (contending that
the fractionalization of topical groups led to a breakdown of the rights-based approach
because those with a stronger background in humnan rights separated fiom
humanitarian direct service).
216 See Frequently Asked Questions, INTERIM HAITI RECO1VERY COMM'N,
http:i/en.cirh.htiabout-usifi-equently-asked-questions.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2012)
[hereinaftcr IHRC(] (explaining that the Intcrim Haiti Recovery (ommission. "I-IR('
is a board of donors and government representatives who was charged with
coordinating overall planning through approving individual humanitarian project
proposals); see also Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 1175 (noting that the
success of this coordination has been limited by staff capacity and lack of compliance
by international actors).
217. See FAN, supa note 21, at 35 (describing Haitian institutions involved in land
rights); I HRC, sop#a note 216 (describing the role of the I HR).
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progress in Haiti engenders strong criticism.218 The accusations
do not just come from the international media: driving through
Port-au-Prince one can see the words "down with NGO thieves,"
spray-painted in Creole across a nearby wall.2 u Local civil society
groups also voice their frustration with the international NGOs
and their exclusionary processes. 221 Whether asserting tenure
themselves or lending credibility to other tenure systems,
international actors have impacted tenure security and the
government's ability to protect tenure security.2 21
The tens of thousands of international actors in Haiti are
not all working with the same approach. In order to investigate
the impact of some of these approaches on Haiti's human rights
obligations for tenure security, this Note divides the
international organizations into three groups: organizations that
assert their own authority to provide legitimate tenure,
organizations that defer to the Haitian government as the most
legitimate source of tenure security, and organizations that view
the Haitian people as central to legitimate tenancy.
218. See generally (,oncannon & lindstrom, sprpa note 16, at 1145-46 (compiling
sources of criticism); Schuller, supra note 5, at 32 (describing Haitian reactions to the
INGO response).
219. See Evelyne Trouillot, Abse Sou Kiot: Reconstrcting Exclusion, ir TECTONIC
SHIFTS: HAITI SINCE THE EARTH1j1AKE, sopra note 9, at 103, 103-05 (describing the
friustration of Haitians who filt ignored by NGOs during the reconst1ruction); see
get erall Concannon & Lindstrom, .sprfa note 16 (highlighting domestic criticism to
the international response);
220. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 92, at 879 (reporting on criticisms fromh Haitian
civil society of the international response to the earthquake); FARMER, supra note 3, at
93 (recounting the friustration of the local civil society trying to be heard in donor
meetings).
221. See Concannon & ILindstrom, sapra note 16, at 1145-46 (discussing how the
actions of international actors after the earthquake generally inhibited the
government's ability to protect human rights): see also supra notcs 97-100 and
accompanying text (describing the Haitian government's responsibility to protect its
citizens from actions by their parties that violate their human rights). It is possible to
argue that many of the state governments involved in the recovery have an
international legal obligation to be involved under the )eclaration on the Right to
Developmcn. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex.
UN. GAOR, 97th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128. at 186 (Dec. 9, 1986)
[hereinalter Development Declaration]. This Note focuses on how these international
actors are pursuing their engagement and the obligation of the Haitian government to
moiniLor Lhat engagement. 1101 whetler or n01o they have a legal obligation to be
engaged.
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1. International Organizations Conferring Tenure: Neocultural
Interventionists
Approach
Several international organizations working in Haiti avoid
the formal and informal systems and instead assert and support
their own claims for tenure. Many of these organizations claim
that they cannot fulfill their humanitarian mission while waiting
for the Haitian government to act on a tenure decision222 They
generally believe that the Haitian government is too
institutionally weak or inconsistent to be trusted to effectively
deliver aid2 23 Many of these organizations report that when they
do try to follow the official guidelines, they face blatant
government corruption. 224 These scholars and practitioners,
termed "neocultural interventionists," argue that in order to be
effective, legal reform efforts should include initiatives that aim
to change the culture of the government.225
One example of international organizations serving as a
source of tenancy is how some organizations find land for
shelter construction. 22b As spontaneous camp settlements
emerged immediately after the earthquake, INGOs established
camp management agencies ("CMAs") to assess the needs of the
residents, coordinate aid, and ensure governance within the
222. See OXFAM, .spra note 5, at 12 (discussing the challenges of providing
humanitarian aid with insecure tenure).
223. See, e.g , Benevolent Assistance supra note 89, at 218 n.30 (discussing how a
weak Haitian government leads to donor latigue and in turn tighter donor
managemient of rccons-uc-tion activities); see also Rosa Ehrnrcich Brooks, The New
mperaisrn: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. RL\V. 2275, 2322 (2003)
(identilying the limitations of the rule of law initiatives).
224. See NANCY Roc, HATl: THE BITTER (RAPES OF CORRUPTION 8 (2008)
(docuncnting hesitancy of intcrinational actors to engage in Haiti because of the
rampant corruption before the earthquake); see also U.N. OFFICE ON DIRUGS & CRIME,
STOEN ASSET RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE: CHALIENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AN)
ACTION PLAN 10 (2007) (reporting that Duvalier Stole the equivalent of approximately
1.7% to 4.5% of Haiti's GPI each year he was in olfice).
225. See Carfield. supr note 60, at 767-68 (summnarizing and then criticizing tLe
position of ncocultural intLerventionists); Edmonds, supa. notc 213, at 64 (asserting that
the Haitian state and the Haitian people are circumvented wvith N(,Os' "neoliberal
transforinatin").
226. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (discussing how some
organizations found land for shelter construction).
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camps. 227 Some INGOs attempted to negotiate with local
authorities for security of tenure to build temporary shelters and
formalize these negotiations with memoranda of understanding
(MOUs). 22 The MOUs, signed by the government official and
the INGOs, outline what land the INGOs may use. These
documents have little formal authority, as notaries were not
used, and the mayors signing them are not authorized to
appropriate land. =221 The non-government organizations
allocated plots of land from these agreements for temporary
shelters 311 In these situations, the symbols of tenure, even the
written ones, are based on the legitimacy of the organization. 31
International organizations also impact tenure security
when they serve as negotiators between the supposed owners
and those living in the camps.23 Often this took place without
any verification of ownership or consultation with those living in
the camps. 33 Critics of this approach claim that it has distanced
227. See Margaret Satterthwaite, I dicatots in Crisis: Righs-Based Harnanita(rian
Indicators in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 43 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 865. 940 (2011) (noting
that because so many camps developed, the aid agencies were not able to establish
CMAs in every camp tacility); Andey6, supra note 9, at 8 (describing forims of
management in reett1ement canps).
228. See Crawlord et al, supra note 135 (describing the multiple layers of tenure
problems in post-cartlquake Haiti); see also OXFAM, supra note 5, at 16 (reporting the
ways that humanitarian organizatiois were able to avoid bureaucracy to deliver needed
aid).
229. See Crawfoird ct al., sup a note 135 (observing that the lack of legal authority
for these ncgotiations could create risk of eviction); Interview with Legal Clerk Ii, Inst.
for justice & )emocracy, Haiti (Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Legal Clerk II] (reporting
on the tactics used by some NGOs to negotiate land access).
230. See Legal Clerk 11, sup a note 229 (reporting that residents were given pieces
of paper conferring the right to use the shelter and absolving the organization of
responsibility for upkeep).
231. See supa note 52 and accompanying text (emphasizing that legitimacy is the
foundation of tenure securit).
232. EVICTION SITUATION, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that nearly half of cases of
thircatened evictions that have been successfully resolved have been iesolved through
mediation); UN-HABITT, supra note 16, at 65 (advising humanitarian actors to
cmphasize ncgotiated solutions" when there is conflict tor land in a communal post-
disaster system). A number of reports indicate that many INGOs made no effort to
verify the ownership of the evictors or assert the tenure rights of IDPs, even when
evictions were taking place in camps they managed. See Satteriwaite, swpra note 227, at
959-60 (observing the reluctance of NGOs to vcri4i ownership based on fiom
interviews with INGO practitioners).
233. Legal Clerk IL, sup a note 229 (describing the interaction, or lack thereot,
be[ween INGOs and those living in leir camips): INT'L ACTION TIES, WE BECAME
GARBAGE TO THEM: INACTION ANT) COMPLICITY IN ILIP EXPUISIONS 5 (2010)
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the groups from the Haitian Government and international
humnan rights law .234 Moreover, they argue that an emphasis on
humanitarian need will not create lasting solutions nor will it
create the infrastructure to protect rights in the future. 235
Inplications on the Haitian Govern men t's Obligations to Protect the
Right to Tenure Security
International organizations operate in a limited area, over a
limited period of time, and in doing so the security of the tenure
they provide may also be limited. 236 Moreover, because the
system is only recognized where the organization is working,
individuals could be denied the benefits of tenure, such as
access to credit, because they happened to enter a camp
directed by certain international actors.23 There is also little
protection from counterclaims through the formal legal
process.2-8 This is further complicated because there are so few
long-term housing options that these "temporary" negotiations
are in reality a long-term agreement2 -9
(estimating that seventy percent of purported landowners involved in evictions do not
have proper title).
234. See A inual Report, supra note 96. ch. V, 1[ 69-75 (concluding that the
approach thus tar in Haiti has neglected the protection of some human rights);
Concannon & Lindstrom, spr#a note 16, at 1186 (arguing that international NGOs
operating independently in Haiti place themselves outside the paradigm of rights-based
accountability).
235. See Annual Report, sopra note 96, ch. V, 75-77 (emphasizing that the
Haitian government and international actors had an opportunity after the earthquake
to impact institutional refoirms); see also Kaclin, supra note 132, at 1 26 ("Nine months
into the response, this has become practically and morally unsustainable. Populations
in need arc shaping their own coping mechanisms to address the imbalance bersween
services and needs, by gravitating towards the camps instead of spontaneously working
towards their own recovery
.
") .
236. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the
legitimacy of tenure is limited to the power and recognition of the provider of tenure).
237. See sopra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (emphasizing the benefits of
tenancy that are recognized beyond the provider of tenancy); see also Concannon &
Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 1185 (noting that studies in camps find that individuals
within camps often have very limited information about the services available wvithin
their own camp, much less services available at other camps).
238. See supa notes 158-70 and accompanying text (describing the process for
dealing with ounterclaims in Haitian courts).
239. See (N Human Rights Expert Urges Putting Hoasing at Core of Post-Disaster
Recoven, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 21, 2011), IlLp://ww.u1.org/apps/n ews/s tory.asp?
News|D-40141 [hereinafter LIN NEWS CENTRE] (quoting the Special Rapporteur on
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The Haitian govermnent is responsible for monitoring and
preventing third parties from violating the human rights of its
citizens, including the right to tenure security. 240 Since
international organizations are allowed to create tenancy
agreements under the auspice of a temporary solution without a
permanent replacement, the government is not able to to fulfill
its obligation to provide tenure security to its people.241 In
addition, the actions by the international organizations make it
more difficult for the government to have the legitimacy to
protect tenure security.242
Even if NGOs were acting on each of these interventions in
a fair and transparent manner, many scholars and practitioners
argue that this form of interv ention does not provide long-term
tenure security2 43, Mediation and housing titles are subject to
the limitations of the international organizations' jurisdictional
power2 44 Should the international organization leave Haiti or
the Right to Adequate housing: "It is evident that in many contexts marked by a lack of
appropriate housing foir all, 'transitional' shelter will never be transitional and in many
cases will even undermine the efforts of permanent and progressive reconstruction and
divert funds from what is needed most."); see Valerie Kaussen, Do It Yourself
International Aid and the Neoliberal Ethos in the Tent Carnps of Port-au-Prince. in TECTONIC
SHIFTS: HAITI SINCE THE FARTHQUAKE, supra note 9, at 125, 127 (noting that there is
still no plan to build permanent public housing tor the homeless or renters).
240. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying tcxt (outlining Haiti's obligation
to protect its citizens rom outside actors violating their rights).
241. See supra notcs 226-35 and accompanying tcxt (Citing the government's
failure to stop INGOs from creating alternative sources of tcnure); supra notcs 97-100
and accompanying text (outlining Haiti's obligation to protect its citizens irom outside
actors violating their rights).
242. See genera114 Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16. at 1175-79 (arguing
that the work of international organizations makes it more difficult for the Haitian
government to fulfill its human rights obligations); Edmonds, supra note 213, at 64
(emphasizing that INGOs undermine the government's legitimacy).
243. See ICG, supra note 2, at 17 (characterizing the approach as -unsustiinable"
because ater the negotiations Lhe individuals move to anoher camp with similarly
tenuous tenure); Andey6, supra note 9, at 25 (noting concern of international
organizations that the demand of land owners will change over time to try to get the
most possible out of negotiations).
244. See Ainilie Gauthier, Haiti in the lace of Forced Evictions. FOCAL,
http:i/www.focal.ca/publicationsifocalpointi435-april-201 I-amelie-gauthier-en (last
visited Mar. 21. 2011) (quoting NGO workers who note the temporal limitations of the
impact of hese negotiations); see UN NLWS CENTRE, supra note 239 (noting that INGO
interventions are not designed to be able to protect rights over the long term).
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move its attention to another camp, the validity of the
agreement and security of tenure come into question. 245
In addition, critics raise concerns about the impact on the
authority of the Haitian government to act as an arbiter of
tenure disputes as a result of these interventions. Because of the
large number of NGOs directly delivering basic services, some
international observ ers note that Haitians view the Haitian
government as increasingly weak.246 The danger is that as a
result of these temporary tenure options, the Haitian
govermnent will be too weak to have the legitimacy to fulfill its
human rights obligation to promote tenure security. 2 47 Some
scholars note that political distractions, such as focusing on IDP
shelter instead of longer-term shelter solutions, tend to make
solving post-earthquake tenancy issues more challenging. 248
2. Deference to the Haitian Government: Rule of Law Advocates
Approach
Some international organizations are strongly critical of
INGOs directly providing tenure and assert that for long-term
success, the Haitian government must be at the center of all
245. See Gauthier, supra note 244 ("Its very frustrating because even if you
successfully negotiate an extension, in a few weeks or months, there will still be no
places or lasting solutions for Orem."); Legal Clerk 11, supra note 229 (noting that there
is no process for the documents given by INGOs to be protcted or formalized).
246. See ()SE supra note 5, at 4 (noting that only twenty-three percent of the
USS3.27 billion in aid money that was spent in Haiti in 2010 was channeled through
the governmcnt.and the amount spent by donors in Haiti is 400 percent of the Haitian
government's internal revenue in 2010); ACTED, supra note 133 (reporting that when
people living in informal camps were asked what sources they trusted most with
information about the reconstruction, sixty-wo percent said they trusted NGOs and
humanitarian agencies, while only fifteen percent said that they trust the local
government).
247. See generally Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16 (arguing that the work
of international organizations makes it more difficult for the Haitian government to
fulfill its human rights obligations); see also Huggins, supra note 12, at 352 (discussing a
downward cycle of tenancy problems that can occur in U ansitioning countries).
248. See Annual Report, supra note 96, 22 (obser ing that people living outside
the camps arc "less visible but not less serious."); Huggins, supra note 12. at 346-47
(outlining the challenges for intcrnational actors engaged in pos-conflict land rights
work).
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interx entions2 49 Often referred to as rule of law advocates, these
groups suggest that it is illogical to assume that all state
inter entions are flawed just because some aspects of the
government system are flawed. 250 These scholars and
practitioners believe that development is more likely to proceed
when a government enacts a universal set of policies through
formal legal reform 2 51 Moreover, they believe that for long-term
tenure security to be successful, it must be upheld by the state
systems.252
One example of an organization trying to reinforce the
government's role in tenure security is a proposed initiative by
the OAS supporting the Haitian government to create a new
cadastre system. 25:  The proposal, funded by the private sector,
was discussed at the highest ranks of government during a
presentation by the Secretary General of the Organization of
,American States to Haitian President Michel Martelly in July
2011.254 Another effort to reinforce the government's authority
is to provide legal representation for victims of forced eviction in
249. See Benevolent Assistance, supra note 89, at 217 (claiming that a weak Haitian
government makes effective aid impossible); see, e.g , Elizabeth Whiinan, Haiti:
Haphazard Aid Hindering LonggTern Recover, IINTLR PRSS SLRV.,Jan. 10, 2010, available
at http:/i T.globalissiues.orginewsi2011 i01 10/8130 ("It doesn't matter how much
money you pour in unless you build up a government that is strong cnough to take
decisions .... What is necessary is for the government itself to take responsibility.").
250. See Firmin-Selers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1115 (arguing that the state can
have an important role in providing title security based on responses fr om11 rural
farmers): FAMLR, supra note 3 (emphasizing through the book that the Haitian
government and consulttion with Haitian actors are central to long term recove and
development).
251. See, e.g., Carfield, supra note 60, at 749-50 (noting that this theol) relies on
the premise that the state has the power and authority to enforce its laws).
252. See, e.g., Concannon & Lindstrom, supra lotc 16, at 1146 (arguing that for
rights to be protected, the capacity of the Haitian government must be supported);
OXFAM, supra note 5 at 4 ("Whatever the weaknesses of the Haitian government, it
remains the sovereign authorit whose engagement is essential if relief. reconstruction,
and development in Haiti are to be successful.").
253. See generall OAS, supra note 6 (noting that many government-run foreign aid
organizations are involved in advising to create a formal cadastre system).
254. See Press Release, Org. of Am. States, Secretary General of the OAS, Jose
Miguel Insulaza, discussed in Port-au-(rince with Haitian President Michele Martelly,
plans tor the modernization of cadastre and land rights inft-astructures (July 2011),
available at hLtp://www.oas.org/cn/spa/docs/Prcss" 20rclcas %20on%20SG%'> 20and%
20Martel(v%20on%20cadastre%20-%201uly%20201 I.pdi.
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court25 5 In the face of the forced evictions, some organizations,
including the sub-cluster Working Group on Housing, Land,
and Property Rights, have advocated for the Haitian government
to use eminent domain in the areas where camps exist or to use
a moratorium on evictions coupled with promoting return and
compensating the land owners. 256 Another ad hoc working
group of local and international actors, called the Haiti Property
Law Working Group, is also in the process of creating a manual
to make it easier to understand the formal registration process.
Implications on the Haitian Government's Obligations to Protect the
Right to Tenure Security
The work of these international actors has an impact on
whether Haitians have the right to tenure security. Some argue
that by focusing on the government programs, the international
organizations are reinforcing a system that is known to fail at
providing equal access to tenure security.2 7 They contend that
the system is too expensive and inefficient to realistically provide
and protect Haitian people's rights.258 Further, these critics warn
that because there is not a significant capital market in Haiti,
tenure security will not promote access to capital 25 9
Proponents emphasize that employing rule of law has the
potential to bring legitimacy to the Haitian government, which
is necessary in order to protect human rights in Haiti
255. See Legal Clerk II, sopra note 229 (noting that these programs are rare);
Jagannath etal., sup note 1, at 13 (describing the challenges of legal aid programs).
256. See PROT. (LU -STER HOUS., LAND, & PROP. WORKING (RP., POLICY ()PTIONS
AND RECOMMENDED APPROACH To ADDRESS FORCED FATICFONS IN POST-EARTHOUAKE
HAITI (2010), available at httlps:/ sites.google.com /site /shelterhaiti2010/files/
EVICTION VM 02 08 linal.doc (compiling contributions from numerous IN(Os and
cluster groups that are pointing towards the need for the state to protect tihe right to
tLenure security).
257. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (noting that elites tend to
have easier access to documentation and legal representation); see also Regan, supra
note 82, at 100-02 (emphasizing that renters and vulnerable populations are not
provided solutions during the reconstruction).
258. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (contending that tihe tormal
programs are inefficient).
259. See Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 19, at 1116 (suggesting that lormal
systems by themselves will not provide access to capital); see also Trouillot, sup a note
219, at 103-07 (emphasizing that the utilization of tc tormal system during
reconsmtruction has reinforced disparities and inequalities).
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generally. 2b() These groups emphasize that the Haitian
government is the only actor to provide legitimacy for a claim
recognized throughout the country and over an indefinite
period of time. 26 I By supporting the Hatian government's
legitimacy, these groups feel they are improving the ability of
the Haitian government to have the legitimacy to fulfill its
obligation to protect tenure security.
3. Haitian People as Central to Tenancy Security: Participatory
Approach
Approach
Unlike the rule of law advocates and the neocultural
interventionists, a third group of INGOs operate with the
assumption that the participation of the Haitian people is
crucial for a successful a land tenancy system.2 62 They argue that
international rule of law efforts have realized limited success,
because they fail to take into account the power of norms.2< A
variant of the rights-based approach, this group asserts that the
protection of rights comes not only from strengthening the
capacity of the "duty-bearers to meet their obligations," but also
for the "rights-holders to make their claims." 264 That is, the
Haitian people are those who are best situated to determine
tenure and construct mechanisms for tenure security265 In this
260. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text (describing how supporting
the Haitian government makes it more likely for rights to be protected over the long
termn).
261. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (describing the power of state
legitimacy for tenure to allow access to capital).
262. See LLG.C, supra note 9, at 7 (observing that the Haitian people and
government of Haiti must be involved in eflorts to spur economic growth in Haiti);
INT'i ACTION TiES, supra note 233, at 26 (emphasizing that without participation even
the most technically sound approach will fail).
263. See e.g, Brooks, supra note 223, at 2322 (identifying the limitations of the
rule of law initiatives); Ryan S. Lincoln, Rule of Law for Wio ?: Stregtheng the Rule of
Law as a Solution to Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 265 BERKLLLY J.
(ENDER I. &JUST. 139, 166 (2011) (contending that rule of law eiforts in the Congo
can only be successful if they take local norins into account).
264. See Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 1147 (discussing the legal
argument for a rights-based approach to assistance in Haiti); see also Satterthwaite, supra
note 227, at 957 (discussing the underpinnings of a rights-based approach).
265. See Concannon & Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 1176-77 (deci ing the lack of
participation from the Haitian people during the implementation of rescue and
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paradigm, the international organizations each determine on an
ad hoc basis whether the formal or informal tenure mechanism
is more appropriate at a given intervention.266
Many organizations in this group are attempting to clarify
tenancy with community participation. One pilot program run
by UN-HABITAT is called a Participatory Enumeration
Exercise26 This project, endorsed by the Haitian government,
will utilize Haitian citizens to survey self-reported and locally
verified tenure in a single neighborhood. 268 Similarly, Habitat
for Humanity is running a small project training community
leaders and local officials in Carrefour-feuillles to clear rubble,
create job opportunities, and register land as it was owned
before the earthquake.2 69
Implications on the Haitian Government's Obligations to Protect the
Right to Tenure Security
Proponents of these programs claim that this methodology
has the greatest likelihood to protect tenure security.27 They
argue that a tenure system based on participation is less likely to
discriminate against tenure rights because it is grounded in
pluralistic agreement of tenure claims.2 71 In addition, they claim
recovely); ABHIJIT BHATTACHA1JLL & ROBERT.A Lossio, EVALUATION OF THE OC-IA
RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE 32 (2011) (quoting one staff member as saying
we do not interact with lo'al NGOs or government, torget about interacting witl
communities"); Satterflhwaite, supra note 227, at 957 ("Haiti is a country witl a vel)
strong democratic popular movement but no one in the international agencies dared
to look at this as an asset.").
266. See HLPWG, TOw-ARDS TENURE SECURI ATLR DISASTER: PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPi ICATION IN HAITI (2010), available at https:/isites.google.comisitei
shelterhaiti20l0/files/100420TowardstenureSecurity, afterEQI-Iaiti.pdf.
267. See UN-HABITAT, PARTICIPATORy ENUMERATION EXERCISE: PROJECT
PROPOSAL (2010) [hereinafter ENUMERATION] (outlining the project goals).
268. See ENUMERATION, .supra note 267, at 2-3 (anticipating that this enumeration
will be particularly beneficial for renters); UN-I-LABITAT, COL'NT ME iN: SURLXEYING
FOR TENURE SECURIFY AND URBAN AN) LAND MANAGEMENT 6 (2010) [hereinafter
(OUNT ME IN] (noting that this project is in line with emerging best practices').
269. See OXIAM1, supra note 5, at 15 (arguing that just solving the tormal tenancy
challenges is not enough for people to feel secure moving home).
270. See FAN, supra note 21, at 38-41 (providing recommendations tor areas of
work tor Oxfam Great Britain); (OUNT ME LIN, supa note 268 (suggesting that
participatory enumeration has the best likelihood of servsing the needs of the poor in a
tenure system).
271. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (summarizing views of
proponents of hybiid tenancy systems).
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that the system's flexibility will allow it to maintain protection of
the right to tenancy in changing the post-disaster
environment.2 72 Critics contend that because these programs are
being done on an ad hoc basis, they will not have the universal
legitimacy that would come from a larger government
program2 73 They also question whether the programs will be
able to provide protection of rights beyond the connection with
the international organizations and withstand contentious
disputes with powerful actors.274
I1. GOING FORWARD: RECOGNIZING AND RELNFORCING
LEGITIMACY
Tenure security is necessary to enable the people and
businesses in Haiti to rebuild the country. 75 Though this Note
outlines the international human rights documents that hold
the Haitian government responsible for providing tenure
security, it is clear from the above that there are many factors
and actors contributing to the deterioration of tenure security in
Haiti. 27b A bureaucratic government system with haphazard
implementation laid the foundation for a property system that
favors those with access to lawyers and money. 277 The
government's poor administrative infrastructure has only made
it more difficult to protect tenure security after the
earthquake. 278
International actors have done little to improve tenure
security. Often ignoring the formal system in their response, the
272. See supra note 73-74 and accompanying text (noting the critical importance
of a flexible tenure system after disasters).
273. See OxFAMI, supra note 5, at 16-17 (suggesting that this must be a
collaboration between the national government and local communities); see also supra
note 78 and accompanying text (arguing only the government can provide universally
recognized tenure security).
274. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that only the state wvould
have the credibilit) to defend a tenure claim to banks).
275. See supa notes 6-10 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
impact of tenure insecurity on reconstruction).
276. See swpra Part LB (outlining Haiti's international obligations to protect
tenure security).
277. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text (decrying the human rights
implications of the implementation of the formal tenure system).
278. See supra notes 151-52 (noting the impact of the earthquake on Haiti's weak
administration).
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options offered by INGOs to protect tenure security rarely
remain in effect after the INGO withdraws from Haiti.27 At the
same time, the most legitimate source of tenure security before
the earthquake-informal, community based ownership
claims-have been weakened on account of mass displacement
and document destruction:2 Unfortunately, the implication of
this failure to protect human rights is plain: businesses are wary
of investing, and Haitians are hesitant to rebuild2L1
This Part focuses on the premise, shared by scholars
supporting many tenure systems, that legitimacy is a
foundational to tenure security in the future.282 A Haitian trying
to rebuild after the earthquake cannot access the benefits of the
right to tenure security unless they have a means to legitimately
assert their claim on a piece of land and protect that claim from
counterclaims.2 3 This Part argues that for a tenure system to be
considered legitimate in Haiti, it must acknowledge norms and
claims as they are understood by Haitians. It argues that for the
system to be able to protect counterclaims over a long period of
time, all actors must work to reinforce the legitimacy of the
Haitian govermnent as the ultimate source of tenancy in Haiti.
Finally, it provides lessons from the shortcomings of the
response in Haiti for international actors to consider during
their next disaster response.
A. The Haitian Government Must Recognize Claims as They are
Understood by Haitians
Scholars promoting different forms of tenancy agree that
legitimacy is a central and foundational element to tenure
279. See supra notes 226-35 and accompanying text (providing examples of
INGOs offering limited tcnurc).
280. Sees r#a notes 207-08 and accompanying text (describing the shortcomings
of the intormal system after the earthquake).
281. See sup a notes 6-10 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
impact of tenure insecurity on reconstruction).
282. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (explaining the fundamentals
of tenure security); supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that legitimacy is
necessarl for eflectiveness).
283. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (defining tcnure security);
supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that tenurc systems will not be efcttive if
they are not viewed as legitimate).
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security. 28 4 It is also clear that the Haitian government, in part
because of poor implementation and in part because of a legacy
of corruption, does not have the legitimacy to confer tenure.2 5
In addition, the mismanaged recover effort and ad hoc housing
response has undermined INGO's legitimacy to protect tenure
security. 286 The people of Haiti, as the primary users of the
system, must decide whether they deem such a system to be
legitimate.28 7 Outside organizations, such as banks, will be more
likely to trust a claim of ownership if the community itself agrees
to that claim of ownership. Therefore, in order to ensure tenure
security the Haitian government has the responsibility to
acknowledge the legitimacy of their voice and recognize their
views of land claims.
Practically, this requires the Haitian govermnent to
recognize the tenure claims for the majority of Haitians that
never participated in the formal land registration process.2 In
order for the majority of Haitian's claims to be recognized, the
government must offer a means of making and transferring a
claim that involves fewer bureaucratic steps. 2W- To encourage
participation, the process for registering a claim should be made
inclusive and transparent. A first step could include
participatory enumeration processes like those designed by UN-
HABITAT and Oxfam. 2 ° The process must be flexible enough
to recognize claims that may have been abandoned since the
earthquake as well as those that were merely dormant during
284. See upra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the points of consensus
between scholars that advocate toral. informal, and hybrid sysLIs).
285. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text (summarizing thc tailure of
the lormal tenure system).
286. See supa notcs 236-39. 243-45 and accompanying tcxt (describing how some
INGOs arc offering insecure tenure options); supra notes 218-21 and accompanying
text (summarizing some of the criticisms of [N(;Os' roles in the Haitian reconstruction
efirt).
287. See supa notcs 263-69 and accompanying text (explaining thc hybrid tenure
approach's focus on deriving legitimacy from the individual users of a tenure system).
288. See supa notes 124-26 and accompanying tcxt (explaining how the maI'qoriLt
of Haitians do not participatc in the formal tcnure systcm).
289. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (noting that the current
registration process is limited to clitcs).
290. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying tcxt (describing INGO eftorts at
enumeration).
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that time. 291 Because the majority of displaced people are
renters, the enumeration process should be flexible enough to
include primary and secondary claims. 292  Trained notaries
could be a valuable asset to this as they already serve as a bridge
between the formal and informal systems. 293
In order to recognize a popular understanding of claims,
the courts also need to improve how they receive and weigh
evidence2 94 First, they need to accept unofficial documentation
of claims as evidence. Second, courts should also increase access
by conducting proceedings in Creole and French and loosening
the formal identification requirement. 29 Finally, creating a
special land court with pro se friendly procedures would help to
fast-track land conflict cases and make it easier for more
Haitians to participate in the process.2-6
In order to recognize popular claims to land, the
government must consider its role in the IDP camps. As many
national and international actors have requested, the
government must put a stop to all forced evictions, as they
undermine the legitimacy of formal judicial and police
processes.29 'Where the government has already used eminent
domain, such as in Carrefour, it should pay the previous land
owners just compensation in a public, transparent manner.29s
Doing so will provide the people living there for the past two
years the opportunity to have their claim on the land
legitimized. Further, the government should create an
opportunity for compensation for the owners of land that is
291. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (noting the importance of
flexibility in tenure systems alter the earthquake).
292. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (finding that most IDPs were
renters before the earthquake).
293. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing the legal
foundation for notaries); see also supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (discussing
the impact of notaries on the inforinmal tenure system).
294. Sees ura notes 159-65 and accompanying text (summarizing the shortlalls of
the judicial process).
295. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (emphasizing the barriers of
language to participating in the court systern).
296. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (citing the impact of the long
queue of court cases on access to tenure clarit).
297. Sees ra notes 166-70 (summarizing the role of governrment actors in forced
evictions).
298. See supra notes 171-76 (detailing the government's use of eminent domain
after the earthquake).
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used as IDP camps. This could result in the public good of the
IDPs being able to focus on rebuilding instead of constant
uncertainty. By taking these steps, the Haitian government will
have the opportunity to realize its obligation to protect tenure
security without discriminating against the poor and vulnerable.
It will also have the benefits of this versatile population group
potentially having a wider connection with the economy. 99
International actors can also play an important role
supporting the government's recognition of informal land
claims. Groups experienced with informal enumerations should
provide information sessions and trainings for government
officials in the key ministries.?° Such groups can also help the
government identify populations that are usually easily missed in
registering claims. Further, they can create tools to help citizens
understand how to make their claims, such as manuals, know-
your-rights brochures, and cartoons. This would serne to build
the capacity of more Haitians to interact with the formal tenure
system. ,01
B. The International Community Must Support the Legitimacy of the
Government to Provide and Protect Tenure Securitv
While international actors and the government can work to
recognize the informal land claims of Haitians, only the Haitian
government can provide protection from counterclaims over an
indefinite period of time..° - The UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, and
ACHR all hold the state as the actor responsible for protecting
the right to tenure security. 3 The influence and protection of
other actors only lasts as long as their interxention.34 In order to
299. See sopra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of a
secure tenure system).
300. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (describing some of the early
enumeration programs in Haiti).
301. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (focusing on the opportunity to
build the capacity of "rights-holders to make their claims").
302. See supra notes 77-81 (describing the strength of a formal tenure system
upheld by a state government).
303. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing the international
law pertaining to tenure security).
304. See supra notes 231-34 (explaining the failure of INGO tenure efforts that
only last as long as their intervention); see also supra notes 63-64. 207-08 (describing
how informal systems can break down once the community is disperesed).
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be successful upholding the right of tenure security, the state
must be viewed as a legitimate actor, legitimate enough to bring
credibility to claims and finality to disputes. 3,11 The state's
legitimacy, therefore, is key to successful protection of the right
to land tenure.
The Haitian government's lack of legitimacy stems in part
from their mismanagement of the tenure system, but also in
large part from international actors' pervasive and consistent
undermining of their authority. 3116 Some of the actions by
international actors, such as creating their own ad hoc tenancy
systems and negotiating ad hoc agreements with would-be
evictors directly undermine the Haitian government's ability to
protect tenure 0 7 The long-term presence of these actors and
their ability to provide citizens with daily service indirectly re-
enforced a view that the Haitian government is not a legitimate
source of authority within its own country.30 While these actions
might have been necessary in the immediacy of disaster
response, two years after the earhquake, they no longer fill that
role. 0
In order to reinforce the legitimacy of the state, and give
the Haitian government the opportunity to realize its human
rights obligations, international organizations must commit to
only conferring tenancy rights in cooperation with the Haitian
government. One positive example can be found in the
forthcoming manual created by the Housing Land and Property
Rights Working Group ("HLPRWG"). - '0 By creating tools for
NGOs, business people, and Haitian citizens to see the legal
steps required to register land in one place, the HLPRWG is
305. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance
of legitimacy to a successfiul tenure system).
306. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
government mismnanagemient of the tenure system); see also supra notes 246-48 and
accompanying text (describing how some IN(,Os undermined the legitimacy of the
Haitian government).
307. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text (describing how some INGOs
impact tenure security).
308. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of
prolonged direct service delivery by INGs).
309. See upra note 243 and accompanying text (noting the impact of prolonged
direct service delivery by INGOs).
310. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (describing the HLPRWG project
to create a manual on the land laws).
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reinforcing the legitimacy of the government's process and
making it easier for more actors to engage in this process.
Similar manuals that cover rental agreements, inheritance,
eminent domain, and forced displacement would help actors be
able to engage with the formal system in more instances.
In addition, international organizations must stop making
ad hoc MOUs for land and negotiating their own resolution to
displacement challenges?11 Instead, they should aim to register
all of their land holdings, or at least verify the ownership of the
land on which they work. They should also strive to provide tools
for people living on their land in temporary or formal shelters
to formally register their land claims. This could be as simple as
having notaries and officials from the DGI provide formal
documentation of primary and secondary ownership, when
shelters are awarded, instead of a document created by the
INGO.32 When there are threats of IDP camp displacement,
INGOs should provide advocacy and representation for
individuals to bring their would-be displacers to the court?1"
INGOs should also continue to call on the national government
to protect displacement victims as part of their responsibility to
uphold human rights.31-
The Haitian government can also enhance its legitimacy by
taking on its responsibility to protect its citizen from rights
violations by third parties and reigning in the actions of the
international community. 3,15 This can be accomplished by
publicly discussing the impact that international organizations
have on the state's ability to fulfill human rights obligations.
More forcefully, the state could also advise donors to refuse
giving financial support to any programs that are not in line with
the land tenure system foreseen by the government. This type of
action may curtail some short-term benefits of aid but will
311. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (describing the practice of
adhoc Memorandum of Understanding ("MOUs") and negotiations).
312. See supra notes 230-31 (reporting that currently some INGOs merely provide
shelter tenants wvith a document wvith their logo).
313. See supra note 165 (noting that there have been some instances of success
with this tactic).
314. See upra notes 146-48 (showing that international actors can be involved in
calling fir a government response to displacement).
315. See sup a notes 97-100 and accompanying text (outlining Haiti's obligaion
to protect its citizens from rights violations by third parties).
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enhance the ability of the Haitian govermnent to better provide
care for its citizens in the future.
International organizations can also make a stronger effort
to assess each other's compliance with human rights standards.
While many organizations were quick to call on the Haitian
government to protect tenure security only a very few were able
to discuss how the work of the international organizations
themselves impacted tenure security.,31 More transparency and
accountability, especially to the Haitian people, in aid delivery
could help protect international organizations from falling in
the trap of short term gains over long term protection of human
rights31 7 Institutional donors should encourage programs that
utilize cell phone technology and enable disaster survivors to
report on the aid they are receiving in real time, as well as list
their needs. This information could be aggregated concisely so
that the Haitian government, partner organizations, and
individual donors can hold the response organizations
accountable.
C. Lessons for the Next Disaster
To be clear, the insecure tenure situation in Haiti was not
completely the fault of the international community. Tenancy
was mostly informal before the earthquake, and was made
increasingly insecure by the land scarcity after the earthquake.- 8
Though the international community did not cause the tenure
insecurity, they did contribute to its intransigence.'3 9 There is an
opportunity to apply lessons learned from the failed
intervention in Haiti so that future disaster responses can better
support tenure security.
First, it is apparent two years after the earthquake that the
international community could have provided more tenure
security if they had stronger means to listen directly to the needs
316. See supra notes 146-48 (summnarizing calls by international actors for the
Haitian government to prevent forced displacement).
317. See supra note 265 (explaining how INGOs failed to comply with their own
expectations tor accountability).
318. See supra notes 124-21 and accompanying text (comparing the security of
tenure before and after the earthquake).
319. See supra notes 236-48 and accompanying text (discussing how the actions of
ING(Os contribute to tenure insecurity).
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of the Haitian people. Haitian community groups and
international actors have strongly criticized the international
response for failing to take into account needs as expressed by
the Haitian community.32° One example of this shortcoming is
the consistent focus on providing humanitarian aid in IDP
camps while Haitian communities said that they would prefer to
leave the camps but did not have other viable housing
options. ,21 If more of the international response provided tools
for rebuilding, instead of entrenching the camps, it is possible
that they could have provided a secure tenure option more
quickly for their customers.322 Before the next disaster INGOs
should work on tools to quickly gauge the needs of the
populations they serve. Mobile technology, as mentioned above,
can be used to gather and mobilize responses in real-time.
Community meetings with genuine opportunities for feedback
in a native language can also foster a sense of trust.
Second, the example of the focus on IDP camps bemoans
another general criticism of the international response in Haiti.
While there continues to be great humanitarian need, a general
failure to consider long-term implications even two years into
the response undermine the formal legal system and the
authority of the state to confer tenure security. - 3 During future
interventions, INGOs should take care to consider how their
actions will impact the legitimacy of the state from the
beginning of their intervention. Donors can encourage this by
refusing to support organizations who do not comply with
disaster priorities identified by the national government and the
citizens of the country.
Finally, international organizations can prepare now by
helping governments create contingencies for tenure systems in
320. See supra note 218-20, 265 and accompanying text (summarizing some of the
criticism of the international conmunity's exclusion of Haitian actors); see also supra
notes 202-04 and accompanying text (describing popular movements asking for
housing rights led by Haitian comln unities that were largely independent of
international influence).
32 1. Sees ra notes 138-40, 247 and accompanying text (noting that the focus on
IDP camps was a distraction from rebuilding in neighborhoods).
322. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing sonc of the
practical reasons that IN(;Os were slow to work in neighborhood reconstruction).
323. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (noting that continuous
delivery of basic selvices by some INGOs undermines the Haitian government's
legitimacy).
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their disaster preparedness plans before a disaster strikes.
Ideally, these plans can be created in consultation with local
communities so that their opinions are incorporated at the
outset. In this process, the international organization will also
have staff that are more familiar with the local tenure process
and may even be able to suggest changes that would increase
resiliency during a disaster. The INGOs will also have the
opportunity to provide training to national government officials
and community leaders about the role of human rights in
disasters, especially related to tenure security. This would
increase the ability of disaster survivors to provide INGOs with
accurate information about how their response would best serve
the current needs.
COACL USION
The people of Haiti have a right to tenure security. They
have a right to make a claim on a parcel of land and to have that
claim maintained against other illegitimate counter-claims. That
right is supposed to be protected by the Haitian government.
Since the earthquake, tenure security in Haiti has become
increasingly perilous. The confluence of international
organizations has only serv ed to further the confusion
surrounding tenancy.
In order to clarify and stabilize primary and secondary
claims on land, the government must recognize the validity of
claims that have not been registered through defunct formal
system. At the same time, international organizations must
reinforce the Haitian government's legitimacy to confer tenure
by stopping programs that run parallel government processes.
in so doing, the government will have a stronger opportunity to
protect the right to tenure security for all its people.
